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Preface 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
My first encounter with contract bidding as a decision-making activity was in Martin Barnes' 
1971 PhD thesis The Design and Use of Experimental Bills of Quantities for Civil Engineering 
Contracts which I came across at UMIST in 1979 the course of my masters research.  Barnes' 
reference to Friedman and Gates led me to the American Society of Civil Engineers and their 
Journal of the Construction Division as it was then known.  Here I found a veritable saga of 
claims and refutations going back to 1956 when Friedman published his seminal work on 
bidding strategy.  Of course the party had long since moved on by the time I arrived on the scene 
but the thrill of the chase and excitement engendered still lingered on the pages of the Journal. 
 Having finished the masters in 1981 I started, tentatively at first, my own approach to the 
subject for my doctoral research.  For a long while I simulated bids from uniform probability 
distributions, plotting the frequency distribution of the winning bids.  Every spare minute of time 
I would spend drawing the shapes of the resulting curves and trying to find their mathematical 
origin.  By the end of 1991, I had the answer, but only in the form of an algorithm wrapped up in 
a Fortran program.  The main feature of this algorithm involved computing the area of sections 
under curves, with narrower and narrower sections giving better and better results.  Even to my 
distant 'O' level maths knowledge, this clearly spelled out 'integration', an insight duly confirmed 
by Ernest Wilde, my good friend and colleague in the University's Department of Mathematics.  
After Ernest kindly spent some time over the weekend putting my algorithm into mathematical 
form, my work really started - first on a method of deriving parameter estimates for the statistical 
models and later on determining the most suitable type of model for 'real world' construction 
contract bids. 
 By 1985 I had finished the bulk of the analysis and spent most of the summer reading 
everything I could get my hands on that was remotely connected to construction contract 
bidding.  This amounted to a lot of reading, and most of this had nothing to do with mathematical 
models or with economic theory.  By the time I had run out of steam reading I had accumulated a 
hugh amount of material and began the task of organising it into some coherent structure to set 
the scene in the thesis.  I had anticipated this taking a day or so as had my masters thesis.  In the 
event, this task took rather more than three months.  The essential cause of the problem was the 
lack of any existing structure at that time in any of the obviously related fields - economics and 
management - or in the more remote areas such as Management Science, Behaviourial Science, 
Pricing Theory, Decision Theory, Operations Research.  Even Psychology and Biology failed to 
contribute a great deal (Biology did provide some interesting analogies on the evolutional 
aspects of bidding, but far too off beat for a PhD introduction!). 
 As I have mentioned on previous occasions, three books were to have a major influence on the 
final outcome.  First Johnson & Scholes' Exploring Corporate Strategy suggested the basic 
structure of the decision process to be that of option evaluation and selection, and from this I was 
able to develop an idea of strategic option identification as a means of restricting option sets 
independently of the selection decision.  Secondly, Loomba's Management: a Quantitative 
Perspective suggested the very fruitful idea of breaking the problem down into deterministic and 
non-deterministic approaches, thus providing a means of separating the many aspects relating to 
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uncertainty.  And finally, Ansoff's Strategic Management showed how a morass of this kind can 
be got together into a whole by shear perseverance and bloodymindedness. 
 The results of these labours helped to gain me my PhD in 1986 and eventually Longman 
publishing my book Contract Bidding in Construction: Strategic Management and Modelling as 
an unexpected additional honour.  The fact remains however that most of the work and thoughts 
reviewed were very much culled from a wide variety of sources with very little cognisance of 
their relative reliability or even importance.  Such emphasis that I have made has been in the 
context of the framework developed and, as such, must be counted as largely theoretical.  What 
has not yet been considered is the emphasis the 'real-world' places on these theoretical notions.  
The tendency of the theorist is to overlook the acute lack of information that surrounds many 
decision-making situations.  As has been found with theories involving 'perfect information', the 
prevalence of imperfect information invariably requires new theories rather than just 
modifications to the old ones.  In my view, construction contract bidding as a subject of study 
has been dying for some time through over-theorising, lack of assumption testing, and general 
lack of 'real-world' input.  It urgently needs some empirical injections to bring it back to life. 
 In 1987 the Science and Engineering Research Council (SERC) let it be known that they 
would give priority funding to the so called 'rolling programmes' of research activities.  As a 
result the Construction Industry Research Consortium (CIRC) was formed comprising a team of 
academics from six universities in the UK.  CIRC met several times over a two year period.  
Eventually a rolling programme was agreed in the procurement of construction work and several 
bids were made to SERC by pairs of researchers in the group relating to this theme.  By this time 
SERC had reorganised their priorities and 'rolling programmes' was no longer de rigueur!  
However, some of the proposed projects had gained momentum and eventually proceeded to 
grant award.  This is one such project. 
 
Martin Skitmore 
October 1992 
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1Introduction 
  
 
 
 
 
This introductory chapter introduces the significance of the problem area and outlines the nature 
of the problem scenario upon which the research is centred.  An overview is given of the generic 
processes involved and the restraints upon the support of current industry practice. 
 
 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
A large percentage of all construction work is awarded on the basis of competitive bidding.  
Under this system, the owner of a project invites a number of prospective contractors to compete 
for a project by tendering bids or proposed bid prices.  The award is made on the basis of the 
proposed bid prices, the project generally being awarded to the lowest responsible bidder. 
 It is contended that since any one particular project contributes a relatively significant part of a 
construction firms' turnover, the bidding decisions on any one project will have a significant 
effect on the short term profit or loss of the firm and therefore repercussions on the firms long 
term strategy and performance (Hillebrandt, 1977).  In addition, in an analysis of UK contracting 
firms from 1983 to 1987, Cook (1990) estimated bidding costs at a mean of 1.2 percent of total 
turnover, with the smallest and largest firms incurring the highest costs.  Consequently, the 
investigation of the bidding process and the development of bidding strategy models has been of 
interest to researchers and practitioners since the 1950's. 
 This research is concerned with the investigation of the contract bidding scenario and the 
application of a computer based information support system to the real world problems of 
contract bidding strategic decisions.  The research focuses on decisions relating to final 
adjustment of cost estimates and formalisation of a suitable bid price. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM AREA 
 
The Contract Bidding Process 
The generic process of competitive bidding is loosely described by McCaffer and Baldwin 
(1986) as comprising two unique but interrelated stages, namely "cost estimating" and 
"tendering".  Cost estimating commences upon receipt of the bid documents from the owner or 
owner's representative and is described as "... calculating the probable cost to the contractor of 
efficiently carrying out the construction work if awarded the contract to construct the project."  
Tendering, on the other hand, is described as "... establishing the final price and terms for the 
contract that will be submitted [tendered] to the promoter or his representative.  This involves an 
assessment of the likely margin of error in the cost estimate together with the risk and possible 
financial effects of undertaking the project."  The term "bidding" however, is used to describe the 
generic bidding process, the term "bid adjudication" is preferred and is used within this text to 
describe this second stage.  It is this stage of the bidding process which is principally investigated 
in this research.   
 Bid adjudication decisions form one of the two principal strategic decisions affecting the 
contracting firms' work procurement and subsequent long term performance, the other being the 
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earlier bid/no bid decision.  Together these two decisions considerably influence the nature of 
projects undertaken by the contracting organisation and consequently effect the strength of the 
firm in the industry.   
 
 
Bid Adjudication Decisions 
Decisions relating to the strategic formulation of the final pricing and terms for a project bid are 
generally made in bid adjudication meetings. 
 The recommended practice is that bid adjudication meetings take place a few days before the 
final bid tender dates, to allow sufficient time for finalisation of the bid documents prior to 
tender.  Summary reports should  be prepared, based on the findings of the cost estimating 
process, and presented at the bid adjudication meeting.  The adjudicators, normally senior 
managers or directors reflecting the significance of such decisions, are then required to review 
the cost estimate and associated information and finalise the contract price (making any 
necessary amendments or additions for risks, uncertainties overheads and profit) as a commercial 
decision (CIOB, 1983). 
 Clearly, if the bid is too high, the contractor will fail to get the contract at the expense of the 
time and money spent on preparing the bid proposal.  If the bid is too low, then the contractor 
will fail to make an adequate profit. 
 Contracting firms have a number of expressed or implied general objectives and goals to 
obtain.  Decision makers are therefore urged to know what these objectives and goals are, how 
they are related to each other, what their relative importance is and how a particular decision on 
any one project is going to effect these objectives and goals. 
 
 
SUPPORT FOR BIDDING DECISIONS 
 
To date, support for bidding decisions has been based on the OR models of Friedman (1956) and 
Gates (1967), focusing on the optimal strategy from the bidders' perspective.  By their 
formulation, adjudication is taken to be a matter of finding an optimal bid mark-up which 
maximises expected profit.  This, like many other early OR approaches to real-world problem 
solving, suffers from the existence of a plethora of simplifying assumptions regarding the context 
of the problem. 
 The assumption of the profit maximisation objective has been most heavily criticised in the 
context of construction contract bidding.  Wong (1978), Stark (1976), Lansley (1983) and Green 
(1989) all agree that such an assumption of rationality is, in general, not favoured by contractors. 
 The work of Toffler (1971) and later Ahmad and Minkarah (1988), Eastham (1986) and Green 
(1989) indicates that other factors and objectives, many of an non-economic nature, are 
considered in bid adjudication. 
 A further factor is that endemic commercial pressures and time constraints often results in 
adjudication decisions being made in haste immediately prior to tender of bids. 
 Thus, despite the importance of adjudication decisions, contractors invariably make heuristic 
decisions based on experience, judgement and perception.  Gut feelings are relied upon to make 
decisions in the face of the uncertainties surrounding the contract bidding scenario. 
 Empirical studies by Cusack (1981) and Pin (1990) however indicate that many contractors 
possess, or at least have access to, extensive information in one form or another but which is not 
fully utilised to support or improve their decision-making processes.  The potential of this 
information for use in supporting bid adjudication decisions is not yet known. 
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SUMMARY 
 
Contract bidding in general, and bid adjudication decisions in particular, necessarily have a 
significant correspondence with the strategy and performance of the contracting firm.  Such 
decisions are known to be highly context dependant relying on a multiplicity of objectives, goals, 
individual factors and subject to high uncertainty and severe time constraints.  It is therefore not 
surprising that decision makers have found little use for formal techniques such as OR, relying 
instead largely on experience and intuition. 
 What seems to be needed is fast access to relevant data concerning adjudication decisions.  
That many contractors may already have such data in their organisations is very encouraging and 
suggests that, when suitably structured, relevant data could be made available in digestible form 
for decision makers. 
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2Aims and Objectives 
  
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter indicates the principal aim upon which the work is based.  This aim is supported by 
the objectives of the research.  An outline is given of the general research philosophy adopted to 
navigate towards these aims and objectives. 
 
 
AIM 
 
The aim of this project is to develop an information system for supporting construction major 
contract bidding decisions. 
 
 
OBJECTIVES 
 
In support of this aim and against the background described in chapter 1 a three year research 
programme was initiated to develop a computer based information system to facilitate direct 
access to the available information, both internal and external to the firm, relating to adjudication 
decisions.  This system will provide decision makers, responsible for bid adjudication strategy 
decisions, with access to the information and tools to support and enhance, rather than replace, 
the decision makers' own judgements and perceptions. 
 The specific objectives were to: 
 
1.identify a sample of construction firms outline business strategy and objectives 
 
2.develop conceptual models of the contract bidding and adjudication scenario and 
management objectives and goals 
 
3.identify the critical success factors governing the bid adjudication scenario 
 
4.identify the critical decision set and critical information set associated with critical 
success factors 
 
5.develop a bid adjudication strategic data and information model 
 
6.translate the strategic data model to a prototype system for iterative development  
 
7.validate and implement the system within the collaborating firms' environments. 
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 Fig 2.1: Research philosophy 
 
 
RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY 
  
 Contract Bidding Decision Support System 
 
7
 
The research has been divided into two principal phases, namely: 
 
PHASE 1Problem analysis through to the development of a conceptual 
prototype system 
 
PHASE 2Initial construction and iterative development of the prototype system through to 
final testing and implementation of the system. 
 
The nature and relationship of these two principal stages of the research is illustrated in Fig 2.1. 
 
Phase 1 
The first phase of the research was initiated with a literature review of the relevant subject areas 
in order to gain a clearer perception of the problem scenario and possible solutions.  This 
provided a starting point from which to undertake the empirical analysis of the two collaborating 
firms.  This background study was supported by initial informal interviews with the two 
collaborating firms. 
 The two contracting firms studied may be described as major UK contracting firms, both 
being placed within the top 30 UK contracting firms according to turnover (Carr, Kitkat & 
Aitken, 1990). 
 The principal aim of this empirical study was to broadly examine the real world procedural 
aspects of strategic contract bidding decisions.  This was followed by a more detailed analysis of 
the procedure, nature and information requirements of bid adjudication decisions.  The analysis 
of the two participating firms is supported by a questionnaire survey of a larger number of UK 
building contracting firms. 
 The next stage of phase 1 served to translate the empirical research into a logical 
representation of the data and information requirements of the adjudication decision maker.  The 
methodology and techniques adopted for this purpose are discussed in greater detail later.  The 
strategic information models produced support the conceptualisation of the prototype system 
requirements. 
 
Phase 2 
This phase of the research involved the development of the conceptual system architecture into a 
working prototype system. 
 A review of the hardware and software and general system requirements for production of the 
prototype at this stage was supported by the phase 1 background study relating to computer 
based information support systems. 
 Following selection of a suitable hardware and software tool set a prototype system was 
constructed.  The prototype was then iteratively developed within the participating firms 
environment.  Finally the system was tested and evaluated within the firms' environments. 
 
Programme for the Research 
The research period consisted of approximately 18 months within each of the two collaborating 
academic institutions.  An overview of the progress of the research is provided in Fig 2.2. 
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 Fig 2.2: Original programme of research 
 
 
ORGANISATION OF REPORT 
 
This report outlines the principal findings and results of the first stage of this research.  The 
report covers the initial background study of contract bidding and bidding theory, decision-
making and computer technology; the development of a research methodology for analysis of the 
problem scenario; the empirical analysis of the two participating contracting firms; the resultant 
strategic information modelling; and finally the development of a conceptual system structure. 
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3The Background Study: General Introduction 
  
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the background research undertaken as a 
precursor to the more formal analysis stage of the work.  The chapter opens with a synopsis of 
the three principal problem areas reviewed.  This statement is in the form of a general statement 
of the problem scenario.  An analysis of the principal points of interest for each of the areas 
reviewed is then discussed. 
 
 Fig 3.1: Problem analysis and principal areas for review 
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STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
Referring to the aims and objectives of the research, as given in the previous chapter, it is 
possible to partition the general problem scenario into three areas of established research, 
namely: 
 
•organisational theory and decision-making 
•contract bidding and bid adjudication theory 
•computer based information systems for decision support 
 
These three schools of research form the basis for the background study undertaken as the 
foundation for this research.  Fig 3.1.  illustrates the three principal areas within the problem 
scenario, from a research perspective. 
 Each of these three areas contains an extensive body of research theory and empirical analysis. 
 Consequently, the analysis and review of the literature relating to these areas proved to be a 
lengthy and formidable task.  Much of the research associated with the first two areas, decision 
theory and contract bidding, is, however, reviewed in Skitmore's (1989) treatment of contract 
bidding in construction.  Indeed, within much of the literature reviewed these two areas were 
often symbiotic.  For the purpose of this study, however, the two are treated, as far as possible, as 
separate topics. 
 The following is a brief analysis of the principal theoretical aspects of the three areas. 
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4The Background Study: Organisational Theory and 
Decision-Making 
  
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Decision-making is the heart of managerial practice.  The day to day operation of any 
organisation stems from the decisions made by its management. 
 According to Keen and Hackathorn (1984), "A central theme in decision support is that one 
cannot improve something one does not understand.  The act of 'supporting' a manager implies a 
meshing of analytic tools into his or her activities".  Unfortunately, there is no position in the 
organisational hierarchy that is less understood than that of the top level managers. 
 Decision-making is by no means a straightforward process and there has been an enormous 
amount of research work on the subject by psychologists, behavioral scientists and applied 
mathematicians since the 1950s (Kharbanda and Stallworthy, 1990).  This section of the 
background study provides a general overview of theory relating to the decision-making process 
and its relation to organisational structure.   
 
 
MINTZBERG'S ACTIVITIES VIEW 
 
Although decision-making is possibly the most important aspect of the senior manager's 
organisational activates it is not their only role.  Before dealing specifically with management 
decision theory it is necessary to grasp the overall perspective of the manager's principal 
functions. 
 Mintzberg's (1973) model of management roles is probably the best known characterisation of 
the activates of senior managers.  He divided executive manager's activities into ten distinct 
roles, which are further divided into three general groups: interpersonal; informational; and 
decisional. 
 
 
INTERPERSONAL ROLES 
 
Figurehead.  Carries out a symbolic role as head of the organisation, performing routine duties 
of a legal or social nature. 
 
Leader.  In the widely recognised managerial duty, is responsible for motivation and 
"activation" of subordinates, as well as staffing, training, promoting. 
 
Liaison.  develops and maintains a personal network of external contacts who provide 
information and favours. 
 
 
INFORMATIONAL ROLES 
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Monitor.  Seeks and receives a wide variety of special information to develop a thorough 
understanding of the organisation and the environment.  In this role, the executive serves as 
the nerve centre of internal and external information about the organisation. 
 
Disseminator.  Transmits information received from outsiders or from subordinates to other 
members of the organisation.  Information ranges from factual information to value 
statements designed to guide subordinates in decision-making. 
 
Spokesman.  Communicates information to outsiders on the organisation's plans, policies, 
actions results, etc. 
 
 
DECISIONAL ROLES 
 
Entrepreneur.  Searches the organisation and environment for opportunities and initiates 
"improvement projects" to bring about change; supervises design of certain projects as well. 
 
Disturbance Handler.  Responsible for corrective action when the organisation faces 
important, unexpected disturbances. 
 
Resource Allocator.  Allocates organisational resources of all kinds. 
 
Negotiator.  Represents the organisation in negotiations. 
 
Although Mintzberg's activities view relates specifically to the roles of executives, many of these 
roles are similarly adopted by the managers of organisational sub-units. 
 
 
DECISION THEORY - PRINCIPLE SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT 
 
Throughout the literature decision-making is discussed in terms of five main schools of thought 
(Allison, 1971; Keen et al, 1978): 
 
•the rational or normative view 
• the "satisficing" view 
•the organisational view 
•the political view 
•the individual differences view 
 
The rational school of thought advocates that decisions are made by an individual, rational 
decision maker who is always consistent, considers economic factors, and is cognisant of the 
relevant cost/benefit ratios.  This school of thought assumes that a decision maker has all the 
required tools and information for making and implementing a decision and also assumes an 
ideal situation that rarely exists in the real world of decision-making.  Bass (1983), Mintzberg et 
al. (1976) and Pounds (1969) suggest that a complete rational or normative model of decision-
making would contain the following seven steps: (1) Recognition of a problem (awareness); (2) 
definition of the problem; (3) identification of causes; (4) development of alternatives; (5) 
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evaluation of alternatives; (6) implementation of chosen alternatives; and (7) evaluation of 
outcomes and the process used. 
 The ideal situation necessary for the rational view does not often exist.  If the requirements for 
the rational view are present, this school is the best, since it seeks the optimal solution, a solution 
that yields the highest payoff in monetary or non-monetary terms.  The satisficing view seeks a 
"good enough" alternative and uses feedback to improve the next solution if possible.  This 
school advocates that an organisation should survive with the present solution and should try to 
obtain a more satisfactory solution in the future. 
 The organisational school of thought tries to generate and implement decisions as the output 
of SOPs imposed by organisational units within the organisation.  A typical business 
organisation may include marketing, finance, personnel and production departments as its 
organisational units.  For any one particular decision each organisational unit will propose an 
optimum solution for its unique set of concerns.  The organisation as a unit then chooses a 
solution that is good enough for all the players and is consistent with the SOPs of the 
organisation as a whole.  For this approach understanding organisational roles, relationships and 
channels of communication is very important.   
 The political school emphasises the bargaining process involved in decision-making.  There 
are several players involved in this process, and each one may influence the outcome of the 
decision-making process differently.  The power and influence of each player determine the 
outcome of any decision.  Usually this type of decision-making ends with a compromise among 
the players.  The major difference between this school and the organisational view is the lack of 
control imposed by the organisation as a unit on the final outcome.  In the political decision-
making process, there is no organisational entity to have the final word on the decision. 
 The individual differences school puts a heavy emphasis on the individual decision makers' 
personality, background, style and so forth.   
 
 
TYPES OF DECISION IN AN ORGANISATION 
 
The concept of structure and types of decision in decision-making is defined by Ackoff (1967) in 
his classification of managerial decisions into three types: 
 
•Structured Decision-Making - Decisions for which adequate models are available or  
constructed and from which optimal solutions can be extracted; 
•Semi-Structured Decision-Making - Decisions for which adequate models can be 
constructed but from which optimal solutions cannot be extracted; 
•Unstructured Decision-Making - Decisions for which adequate models cannot be constructed. 
 
Ackoff's first classification does not need a decision maker as it represents an area where 
standard well defined operating procedures exist.  Record keeping operations, payrolls and 
simple inventory problems are examples of this kind of task, in which computer technology have 
already been of significant help. 
 Semi-structured decisions are those that are not quite as well defined by standard operating 
procedures as are structured decisions.  However, these decisions include structured aspects that 
greatly benefit from information retrieval, analytical models and information technology in 
general. 
 Unstructured decisions are unique in nature, are mostly non-recurring, and have no standard 
operating procedure.  In these circumstances, the decision makers' intuition plays the most 
significant role. 
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 Ackoff's second and third type of managerial decision represent areas where neither intuitive 
judgements or heuristics (as a result of the complexity of computation) or an algorithmic model 
(because of a need for subjective analysis) are wholly adequate.   
 Fig 4.1 illustrates organisational levels (Anthony, 1965) and types of decisions in the 
organisational environment. 
 
 Fig 4.1: Managerial levels and types of decision in the 
 organisation 
 
 
RELATING INFORMATION TO THE DECISION PROCESS 
 
Information is the basic input to organisational decision-making.  Executives and senior 
organisational unit managers devote significant amounts of time to the acquisition of information 
through interacting with people and processing documents.  A direct relationship between the 
quality of information used by decision makers and the quality of their decision-making 
performances has been well established (Halpin et al., 1971; Manis et al., 1978; March, et al., 
1982; and Mintzberg, 1973).  Even for high quality information however, too much information 
past some optimal point can actually lead to decreased decision-making performance.  Ackoff 
(1967) suggests that managers suffer more from an over abundance of irrelevant information, 
rather than a lack of relevant information. 
 Information sources are discussed under two general classifications: 
 
1Location of the information source - This refers to whether the information source is 
located inside or outside the organisation.  Both Aguilar (1967) and Keegan (1974) use this 
external/internal dichotomy. 
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2Medium of information transmission - Mintzberg (1973) classifies access to information 
sources according to  five basic media: mail, telephone, unscheduled meeting, scheduled 
meeting and tours.  A more simple dichotomy would be verbal versus written media. 
 
Mintzberg (1973) suggests the information collected by executives and senior managers is used 
if four ways: (1) to disseminate it to others; (2) to develop value positions for the firm; (3) to 
identify business problems and opportunities; and (4) to develop mental images - 'models' of how 
the organisation and its environment function. 
 Mintzberg contends that mental models help the executive deal with the complexity inherent 
in his job.  He says, "In effect, the manager absorbs information that continually bombards him 
and forms it into a series of mental models of the internal workings of his organization, the 
behaviour of subordinates, the trends in the organization's environment, the habits of associates 
and so on. 
 
 
STAGES OF THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
 
The decision-making process itself is defined as three distinct stages, intelligence, design and 
choice (Simon, 1960), however, these stages are generally integrated by the decision maker into 
a single process.  Mintzberg et al. (1976) similarly conclude that although distinct phases of a 
strategic decision process could be identified there was no simple sequential relationship 
between the phases.  A fourth phase 'review', was later added to this model (Simon, 1977).  Fig 
4.2 illustrates the relationship of these three principal stages. 
 The Intelligence phase involves the study of an environment for conditions requiring 
decisions.  Data are collected from a wide variety of sources (internal and external) and 
processed to provide the decision maker with information from which the decision maker may 
find ways of approaching the problem.  The intelligence phase is akin to the 'informational role' 
of Mintzberg's (1973) activities view of managerial roles.   
 In the Design stage, the objective is to generate alternatives and invent, develop and analyze 
possible courses of action.  This involves the development of models to carry out such 
explorations. 
 The Choice phase involves the selection of the best and most effective course of action from 
those investigated. 
 The design and choice stages may be collectively associated with Mintzberg's activities view 
relating to managerial 'decisional roles'. 
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 Fig 4.2. Stages in the decision making process 
 
 
 
MOTIVATION FOR DECISION-MAKING 
 
Alderfer (1972) proposes three basic categories describing motivation for decision-making: 
existence needs, relatedness needs; and growth needs.  Existence needs relate to the need for 
physical entities that are in limited supply, such as food, clothing, etc.  Relatedness needs involve 
the social aspects of human intercourse such as communication and the need for self-respect or 
the respect of others.  Growth needs refer to the drive to achieve fulfilment of objectives, goals 
and potential.  This type of theory is often referred to as a 'need-based' theory of motivation. 
 Alternative views (e.g., Vroom, 1964) propose an 'expectancy' theory of motivation.  These 
theories of motivation tend to focus on the expectations people have regarding the outcomes 
associated with different courses of action.  Thus individuals will make choices based on the 
attractiveness of possible outcomes and their relative probability of occurrence (Skitmore, 1989). 
 
 
EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS IN DECISION-MAKING 
 
Efficiency in decision-making is concerned mainly with reducing costs, turnaround time and 
reducing clerical staff.  Effectiveness, however, is concerned with the appropriateness of a 
decision. 
 A decision may be efficient by reducing costs and turnaround, yet may be ineffective if the 
task does not accomplish any known goal.  For example, assume you can build a high tech office 
building for 10 million.  You may have made a big effort to minimize the cost/benefit ratio 
through value analysis etc.  and it may be true that you have produced this building at the lowest 
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possible cost.  In this case you can say you have been efficient.  However, if nobody is willing to 
pay even 5 million for this building then you have been efficient but not effective. 
 
 
PRINCIPAL AXIOMS OF THE DECISION ENVIRONMENT 
 
In general, commercial decisions take place in a dynamic environment.  The decision 
environment is in a continuous state of flux ensuring that any state of environment will most 
likely be different some way at the next moment.  The decision environment is discussed here in 
terms of the principal stimuli influencing it, namely: (1) internal and external constraints; (2) 
time pressures; (3) uncertainty; and (4) bias and inconsistency.   
 
Internal and External Constraints 
After defining a problem the next step in our model involves analysis of the problem in terms of 
the constraints surrounding the problem.  These constraints take the form of two sets: internal 
and external (Bidgoli, 1989:39).  A decision maker has some control over internal constraints, 
i.e., those constraints imposed internally.  Under certain conditions some of these constraints 
may be removed or modified in order to fit a particular situation.  Typical examples of internal 
constraints are: 
 
•Resource limitations (labour, plant, materials, etc.) 
•Physical limitations (operating capabilities) 
•Organisational policies 
•Employee welfare 
•Geographical layout (region, location, etc.) 
•Staffing policies 
•Corporate arrangements (contracts, procurement etc.) 
•Image issues 
•Human issues (morale, motivation, etc.) 
•Economic factors (investment structures, loans, etc.) 
 
The more exacting constraints imposed on decision makers are the external constraints, deriving 
from the organisations external environment.  These constraints are usually fixed, i.e., the 
decision maker cannot change or alter them.  The organisation must modify its decisions and 
operations in order to comply with these constraints.  Typical external constraints are: 
 
•Resource suppliers 
•Customers 
•Unions 
•Public images 
•Labour pools 
•Legal issues 
•Environmental constraints 
•Cultural issues 
•Financial communities 
•Tax structures 
•Market conditions 
•Government regulations 
•Economic conditions 
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•Political changes 
•Advances in technology 
•Infrastructure changes (distribution) 
 
Time Pressure and Decision-Making 
A large proportion of the literature concerning managerial decision-making has been concerned 
with whether or not managers adhere to the rational model in practice (e.g., Bass, 1983; McCall 
and Kaplan, 1985; Nutt, 1984).  Kenny and McQuade (1988) suggest that at least some of the 
variations in decision processes observed, in a series of empirical studies, are the result of 
'general and selective time pressures'. 
 General time pressure refers to those situations in which the entire decision process occurs 
within a framework of time restriction.  Selective time pressures occur where the restriction on 
available time becomes known to the decision maker at a particular stage of the decision-making 
process. 
 Decisions under time pressure, according to Bronner (1982), are characterised as situations in 
which it is not sufficient merely to find a solution or the most effective result.  Rather, the 
solution must also be completed within a limited time-frame.  Bronner observes that limited time 
is one of the most significant factors affecting decision processes.  He goes on to suggest three 
conditions necessary for the occurrence of time pressure: (1) decision time - a defined interval 
within which the decision must be made and thus a formal declaration of action taken; (2) 
sensitivity - individuals possess different biological constitutions and cognitive characteristics, 
individuals also possess varying degrees of sensitivity to time pressure; and (3) problem intensity 
- subjective evaluation of the importance of the problem from the perspective of the decision 
maker. 
 Holsti (1978) also suggests that time pressure: (1) increases the propensity to rely on 
stereotypes; (2) narrows the focus of attention and impedes the use of available information; (3) 
reduces the resistance to premature closure; and (4) impairs the ability to estimate the range of 
possible consequences arising from a particular policy choice. 
 
Decision-Making and Uncertainty 
In the design and choice and implementation stages of the decision-making process decisions are 
made either under certainty or in the face of uncertainty (Bidgoli, 1989: 34).  In decision-making 
under certainty, a decision maker has access to all the needed information for making and 
implementing a decision.  With decisions made under uncertainty the decision maker is faced 
with a series of alternatives and states of nature.  Sometimes there is a probability factor 
associated with each state of nature, or there may be no probability information available to the 
decision maker. 
 
Bias and Inconsistency 
Skitmore (1989:18) suggests that decision-making ability, when considered in isolation from 
motivation and constraints, is a function of decision makers' limited judgemental process in 
dealing with the three stages of our decision model.  Such limitations are the result of the 
decision maker's information processing capabilities, necessary to support decision-making.  
These limitation are discussed in terms of bias and inconsistency.   
 Skitmore discusses the work of Tversky and Kahneman in examination of biases in decision-
making.  A limited number of factors (termed heuristics) were identified.  These factors seemed 
to guide human behaviour in performing complex information processing tasks.  It is suggested 
that in many cases these heuristics appear to result in reasonable judgements but they can often 
lead to distorted and systematically erroneous decisions.  Three fundamental heuristics involved 
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in judgement are discussed: representativeness; availability; and anchoring and adjustment 
(Kydd, 1988 describes a similar set of biases based on the work of Hogarth and Makridakis, 
1981). 
 Representativeness, or similarity basically suggests that a decision maker's judgement is made 
on the assessment of the degree to which one situation resembles another.  The examples given 
relate to the description of a number of individuals to a group of people who are also given a 
selection of occupations from which they must select one which they consider best suits any one 
individual.  The results of the study indicated that perceived stereotypes were used to assess the 
degree to which the individual was representative of a certain occupation, rather than more 
tangible factors, such as for example, the fact that the sample of individuals contained a majority 
percentage of one particular profession.   
 Availability is described as a situation in which decision makers assess the frequency of a 
class or the probability of an event by the ease with which instances or occurrences can be 
brought to mind. 
 Adjustment and anchoring occurs where decision makers make estimates by starting from an 
initial value or situation that is adjusted to yield the final answer.  These adjustments are 
suggested as being typically insufficient. 
 Skitmore suggests that inconsistencies in decision-making mean that identical circumstances 
do not always lead to identical decisions.  Judgement is inconsistent because human judgement is 
not a fully analytical and controlled process, therefore inconsistency is an inherent characteristic. 
 
 
GROUP DECISION-MAKING 
 
The rational models of managerial decision-making assume a solitary decision maker taking 
decisions in isolation, this scenario is seldom valid.  Overwhelmingly, such strategic choices are 
made as a result of extensive group interactions, where the wisdom and judgement of a number 
of individuals are employed to refine the decision in the face of complexity and uncertainty. 
 In the group decision-making scenario the need for effective communication between the 
participants within each of the decision stages, intelligence, design and choice, becomes an 
essential requirement. 
 Group problem solving is often an ineffective process, involving a complex trade-off between 
process gains and losses (Steiner, 1966).  Janis (1973) analyzed the foreign policy decision-
making of groups in several presidential administrations.  He concluded that these very cohesive 
and close-knit groups may be prone to "group-think", which he defines as deterioration of mental 
efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgement in the interest of group solidarity.  For example, 
group members involved in the Kennedy administration decision to invade Cuba in April, 1961, 
reported having reservations about the decision, but did not let their differences be known for 
fear of appearing week and unintelligent or upsetting the cohesiveness of the group.  If the group 
members involved in the process had employed a mechanism for safely displaying their different 
opinions, this potentially disastrous situation might have been avoided. 
 
 
ORGANISATION DECISION-MAKING 
 
Management scientists and researchers have, for some time, advocated the exercise of business 
planning (eg., Ansoff, 1965; Argenti, 1974).  The purpose of business strategy is to give direction 
to an enterprise; specifically to give long-term direction to the firm.  In the commercial 
organisation, the business strategy is the result of corporate/organisational strategic decisions.  
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These strategies are laid down in the firms policy and strategy statements.  These corporate 
'rules', dictates or procedures can determine the nature and scope of other decision options and 
the mode of selection (Skitmore, 1989). 
 Mintzberg's model of management roles, discussed previously, outlines one management role 
as an 'informational disseminator'.  In relation to organisational decision-making, the manager is 
responsible for transmitting organisational decision policies and value statements to subordinates 
in order to guide their decision-making. 
 
 
ANALYTICAL DECISION MODELS 
 
It is not within the scope of this research to examine all the analytical methods that can be used 
in the course of decision-making: they include linear programming; inventory models; network 
models; Markov chains; simulation; project evaluation using net present value; return on 
investments; payback period and risk analysis; and the life cycle concept for process selection 
and product planing. 
 These models may be classified in one of many ways, they are described here as two unique 
classes: optimisation models and non-optimisation models (Bidgoli, 1989: 96). 
 Optimisation models are designed to generate the best possible solution to a particular 
problem, such models are generally suited to structured decision problems.  Optimisation models 
include the so called Linear Optimisation Models (Allocation models, Assignment models, 
Transportation models, Network models); Inventory Optimisation Models (Economic order 
quantity, Economic manufacturing quantity); Portfolio Optimisation models (Present value, 
Future value, Internal rate of return); Dynamic Programming Optimisation Models; and 
Nonlinear Optimisation Models. 
 Non-optimisation models are designed to provide a "good enough" answer to a problem using 
different techniques.  These type of model are largely suited to semi-structured decision 
problems.  Non-optimisation type models include Statistical Models (Exponential smoothing, 
Moving average, Mean, Simple linear regression, Multiple linear regression, Nonlinear 
regression); Decision Tree Models; and Simulation Models. 
 For a more comprehensive exposition of these models see: Anderson et al. (1988); Jones and 
Twiss (1978); and Martino (1978). 
 
 
INTUITIVE DECISION-MAKING 
 
Whilst it is true that quantitative optimisation and non-optimisation models, such as those listed 
above, can help the decision maker, it remains equally true that there is still no substitute for a 
managers intuition, experience and judgement.  These judgements can and should override the 
conclusion that is reached using quantitative factors. 
 Kharbanda and Stallworthy (1990) identify two basic types of intuitive decision-making: 
formal and informal. 
 
Formal intuitive decision-making involves: 
 
•check-listing 
•a rating and priority system 
•morphological analysis 
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•brainstorming - this concept seeks to find a few worthwhile ideas by crating a climate for 
suggestions 
•synetics - this word is derived from the Greek, and means the joining together of different 
and apparently irrelevant elements.  This should result in the generation of creative 
solutions to a problem.  The problem is looked at in a new and previously unthought of  
way, by making the strange familiar and the familiar strange 
•the Delphi method - this is designed to develop creative solutions to problems by using 
groups of experts, structuring group communications in such a way as to make it effective 
•the Kepner-Tregoe approach - this method distinguishes problem analysis from decision-
making.  These two aspects are closely interrelated, but it helps managers to appreciate that 
there are two separate aspects involved They are thereby enabled to use the information 
they have more efficiently; and 
•statistical decision theory - this is the Bayesian procedure for utilising both numerical data 
and judgemental evaluations for making decisions in conditions of uncertainty. 
 
Informal intuitive decision-making involves the use of heuristics and cognitive modelling.  This 
type of decision-making is described by Kharbanda and Stallworthy as '...creativity, a sixth sense 
or even a gut feeling.' Intuitive decision-making is said to utilise lateral thinking, which the 
Concise Oxford Dictionary describes as "seeking to solve problems by unorthodox or apparently 
illogical methods". 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
In this section different approaches to the decision-making process were discussed.  Contract 
bidding is essentially about decision-making in a dynamic environment.  An understanding of the 
principles and axioms of decision-making within the organisation is therefore a prerequisite to 
the development of any system aimed at supporting contract bidding decisions. 
 Phases in the decision-making process, different types of decision within an organisation, 
managerial roles and the role of information in decision-making have been discussed.  These 
principal aspects of organisation and decision theory are pulled together in a generic model of 
organisational decision-making, represented in Fig 4.3.  In addition the model highlights the 
existence of the internal and external information requirements of the decision maker. 
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 Fig 4.3: Organisational Decision-Making Environment 
 
 This generic model, representing a large body of the literature relating to decision theory 
forms the basis for the analysis of contract bidding adjudication processes (cf., Skitmore, 1989: 
fig. 5.4.) 
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5The Background Study: Contract Bidding and 
Adjudication Theory 
  
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A review of the literature revealed an absence of any distinct body of research relating 
'specifically' to bid adjudication theory.  Bid adjudication theory was largely found, throughout 
the literature, to be synonymous with the theory relating to 'contract bidding'.  The nature of this 
relationship is further explained in examination of the general taxonomies of contract bidding. 
 The following review outlines the general principles and axioms of contract bidding and more 
specifically, bid adjudication.  The objectives of the firm in bidding are discussed, together with 
the adjudication decision environment.  The review ends with an overview of the large body of 
research relating to analytical models for competitive bidding. 
 
 
CONTRACT BIDDING - PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 
 
A large percentage of all construction work is still awarded on the basis of competitive bidding.  
Under this system, the owner of a project invites a number of prospective contractors to compete 
for a project by tendering bids or proposed bid prices.  The award is made on the basis of the 
proposed bid prices, the project generally being awarded to the lowest responsible bidder. 
 Contract bidding is a complex process involving the management and co-ordination of a large 
number of parties involved in the assimilation of a large amount of divergent information.  This 
information is processed and subsequently collated and explained to senior management.  All 
this is generally done within narrow time constraints (Cusack, 1981).  The following describes 
the principal participants and processes of contract bidding, highlighting the relationship with bid 
adjudication.   
 
 
Participants 
Harris and McCaffer (1989) divide the parties involved in contract bidding into three classes, as 
described in Fig 5.1. 
 The client's staff or professional representatives are the person or organisation, or agents of 
the former, for whom the building work is undertaken.  Generally the client's representatives are 
responsible for producing the development, design and technical direction of the works including 
the preparation of specifications, bills of quantities, drawings and other contract documents.  It is 
these documents that describe the nature and extent of the work to the contractor. 
 The construction contractor's personnel are further divided by Harris and McCaffer into seven 
classes: senior management; estimators; planners; buyers, plant managers, temporary works 
designers; and site management. 
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 Fig 5.1: Participants in the contract bidding process 
 
 Senior management implies company directors or those of similar status.  Their role is 
principally twofold: (1) decisions relating to whether or not to bid on any one contract; and (2) 
final decisions relating to the bid to be tendered, having considered the estimate of cost and 
resources involved, as produced by the estimators, and other relevant information. 
 The estimators are the personnel responsible for producing the cost estimates.  Generally it is 
the estimating team that control and coordinate the bidding process.  In addition they are 
responsible for producing the summary documents for presentation to senior management. 
 The planners are responsible for producing the construction plans or programmes.  These 
programmes provide the overall duration of the project and the duration and sequence of key 
activities. 
 Buyers are responsible for purchasing materials and placing orders with hire companies and 
sub-contractors.  They coordinate the procurement of quotations for resources. 
 Plant managers are responsible for the company's plant department and supply estimators with 
current hire rates and availability.This role is often assimilated by planners. 
 Temporary works designers are responsible for designs of major temporary works. 
 Site management are responsible for the subsequent execution of projects on-site.  Their role 
in bidding is in advising on methods of construction and development of the method statement. 
 
External organisations include materials suppliers, plant hire companies and sub-contractors 
responding to enquiries for quotations from the contractor. 
 Relating specifically to the bid adjudication process, the emphasis is on the involvement of 
senior management and senior estimators reviewing summary documentation collectively 
produced by the above participants. 
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Principal Stages 
Most studies relating to contract bidding have proposed that the scope of activities cover a range 
of tasks that are carried out between the receipt of the bid documents and a decision being made 
by the contractor to tender a bid, and the point at which the bid is tendered to the client's 
representative (e.g., Fellows and Langford, 1980; McCaffer and Baldwin, 1986; Ward and 
Chapman, 1988; Harris and McCaffer, 1989; and Betts, 1990).   
 Numerous other researchers have produced similar process models of the contract bidding 
process, most of which exhibit an analogous nature.  Fig 5.2 identifies the principal stages of the 
contract bidding process as discussed in the literature reviewed. 
 
 Fig 5.2: Conceptual model of contract bidding procedure 
 
 Harris and McCaffer (1989) discuss the process of contract bidding under three principal 
headings; (1) the cost estimating process; (2) bid adjustments; and (3) tendering the bid.  The 
latter two stages often being integrated in a single process more frequently referred to as 'bid 
adjudication'.  Green (1989:54) cites Farrow, in developing a distinction between [cost] 
estimating and tendering [bidding], who suggests: 
 "... 'estimate' will mean the quantity, description, unit rate and total cost (prime cost) of the 
works inclusive of preliminary items, but excluding overheads and profit allowances.  'Tender' 
[bid] will mean the sum of the [cost] estimate plus a lump sum or percentage addition to the unit 
rate to cover overhead charges and profit." 
 The estimating process is further subdivided by Harris and McCaffer into the following seven 
steps: 
 
1Decision to bid - this stage is mainly the responsibility of senior management.  Three stages 
are identified, during the contract bidding process, where this decision may be made: 
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during pre-selection, if a pre-selection procedure is used; after receipt of the bid documents; 
and finally after the cost estimate has been prepared. 
 
2Programming the cost estimate - after receipt of the bid documents, and a positive decision to 
bid, the tasks required to complete the cost estimate are programmed. 
 
3Collection of cost information - the cost information required by the estimator for labour, 
plant, materials and sub-contractors. 
 
4Project study - to gain a more thorough understanding of the nature of the project the 
estimator/planner undertake: a study of the drawings; and a site visit and meeting with the 
client's representatives.  These studies will assist in the development of a method statement. 
 
5Preparing the cost estimate - preparing an estimate to determine the direct costs to the 
contractor of executing the work defined in the contract documents. 
 
6Site overheads - the estimator assesses the site overheads, eg., accommodation, small plant, 
water, heating, etc.  Such costs are normally allocated to the preliminaries section of the 
bill. 
 
7Estimators' reports - on completion of the cost estimating process the estimators are 
responsible for producing a set of reports for consideration by senior management.   
 
Bid adjudication, or bid adjustments, is carried out by senior management in consultation with 
those involved in the bid preparation on any one project.  Based on the reports prepared by the 
estimating team, the senior managers assess the cost estimate and decide on the adjustments and 
additions to cater for risk, company overheads and profit.  The addition for risk, overheads and 
profit are frequently referred to in the literature as the 'mark-up'.  It is the bid adjudication 
process, and its information requirements, that is of primary interest in this research. 
 Tendering the bid.  The bid value arrived at after the adjudication meeting is entered by the 
estimators into the bid documents as required by the contract documents.  Apportionments are 
made, where a priced bill of quantities is used, for strategic adjustments and for the mark-up. 
 
Adjudication Summary Information 
The adjudication meeting and subsequent adjudication decisions are based largely on the 
analysis and evaluation of information disseminated by the estimating team.  Much of this 
information is contained within a number of summary reports.  These reports typically contain 
the following information (Harris and McCaffer; 1989:237): 
 
•a brief description of the project 
•a description of the method of construction 
•notes of any unusual risks which are inherent in the project and which are nor adequately 
covered by the conditions of contract or bills of quantities 
•any unresolved contractual problems 
•an assessment of the state of the design process and the possible financial consequences 
thereof 
•notes of any major assumptions made in the preparation of the cost estimate 
•assessment of the profitability of the project 
•any pertinent information concerning market and industrial conditions 
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In addition the estimating team produce cost reports outlining the cost of the work included in 
the cost estimate.  These reports typically give details of: 
 
•main contractor's labour 
•main contractor's plant allocated to rates and in preliminaries 
•main contractor's materials 
•main contractor's own subcontractors 
•sums for nominated subcontractors 
•sums for nominated suppliers 
•provisional sums and dayworks 
• contingencies 
•amounts included for attendance on domestic and nominated subcontractors 
•amounts included for materials and subcontract cash discounts 
 
In addition the estimator's may produce a cash flow forecast based on a range of assumed mark-
up values. 
 These reports are evaluated in conjunction with other information produced during the cost 
estimating process, eg., programme, temporary works design, etc.  This is then transposed with 
more general corporate and environmental information, and the decision makers' own judgement 
and perceptions.   
 
The Cost of Bidding 
The direct effect of cost estimating on the operating overheads of the construction firm has been 
investigated by several researchers.  Broemser (1968), in an analysis of one construction 
company, found the cost of estimating to represent 9.1 per cent of total assets and 1.8 per cent of 
total receipts, this figure representing 0.18 per cent of the value of each project estimated, as only 
10 per cent of the estimated projects were actually obtained.  Park (1966) suggests a figure 
between 0.5 and 2.0 per cent of project value.  Park offers the following rule of thumb used by 
some contractors on larger projects: 
 
total estimating cost = 0.005 x estimated direct material cost + 0.015 x estimated direct labour 
costs 
 
ie., 1 per cent on a $1m contract. 
 
More recently Cook (1990), in a study of 50 UK contracting firms, proposes that the mean 
bidding costs are around 1.2 per cent of total turnover.  In addition Cook suggests that the greater 
scope for reducing bidding costs lies with large and small contractors as, on average, they appear 
to incur higher costs than medium sized contractors.   
 
 
OBJECTIVES OF THE FIRM IN BIDDING 
 
The significance of bid adjudication decisions to the firms success in the market has already been 
discussed.  Such decisions are akin to the primary strategic objective of the firm i.e., its 
continued existence and further development (Dressel, c1980). 
 Fellows et al (1983), in an examination of the nature of business strategy, differentiate 
between strategic and tactical decision objectives.  Strategic decisions are described as the few 
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broad long term decisions which affect the future of the whole business.  Tactical decisions (or 
goals) are described as operational decisions made for part of the business.   
 Bid adjudication decision may be described as tactical decisions that assume strategic 
significance directly relating to achievement of the firms business strategy. 
 
Strategic Objectives 
Skitmore (1989) categorises the strategic objectives of the firm into three general groups, 
monetary objectives, non-monetary objectives and market-related objectives. 
 
 OBJECTIVE  SOURCE 
Efficient use of resources Fryer (1985) 
Filling plant Capacity Benson (1980) 
Maintain size of workforce Cusack (1981) 
Keeping key workers Niss (1965) 
Serving client Well Fryer (1985) 
General Community Barnard (1981) 
Improving quality of service Niss (1965) 
Retain confidence of suppliers and subcontractors Moore (1984:19) 
 
Source: Skitmore (1989:84) 
 
 Table 5.1: Non-Monetary Objectives 
 
 
Monetary objectives usually expressed in terms of profit or profitability follow the convention of 
profit maximisation.  Wright (1970) describes the concept of profitability as a function of three 
factors: turnover; capital investment necessary to support turnover; and the margin of profit 
earned.  This view has been much criticised throughout the literature (Fellows et al, 1983; 
Hillebrandt, 1974; Green, 1989; Ahmad, 1988, for example) and the current trend is towards the 
profit 'satisficing' theory proposed by Simon (1957).   
 
Non-monetary objectives are those not directly associated with profit generating.  Table 5.1. 
summarises some of the principal non-monetary objective discussed in the literature. 
 
Market related objectives are expressed in terms of aspirations.  A summary of some of the 
principal objectives discussed in the literature is given in Table 5.2. 
 
 OBJECTIVE  SOURCE 
Increase in market Share Fellows et al.  (1983); Barnard (1981) 
Staying in existing markets Adrian (1973: 371); Cook (1981); 
Foster (1974) 
Enter new markets Woodward (1975: 170); Foster (1974) 
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Growth in number of markets Barnard (1981), Fellows et al.  (1983: 
27) 
 
Source: Skitmore (1989: 86) 
 
 Table 5.2: Market-Related Objectives 
 
 
Skitmore also discusses Bengtsson's (1985) hypothesis that there is no single unambiguous 
company goal, and that multiple objectives are required if the relations of an organisation to the 
environment are to be understood.  Fellows et al (1983: ch 1-3) provide a more detailed 
discussion of strategic planning within construction organisations. 
 
Tactical Objectives (Goals) 
Specifically relating to bidding, Hudson (1988) suggests that a more tangible tactical objective of 
the contracting firm is not simply to win the project, but rather to win it at a price which will 
enable him to properly complete the work on time and make a profit. 
 Taking this concept a stage further a reversion to an emphasis on the objective of profit 
maximisation at the tactical stage may be suggested.  Profit margin aggression, as opposed to 
margin protection has been forced upon the contracting organisation as a result of increasing 
competition.  The margin aggressive contractor sees opportunities beyond estimated profits, 
looking for apparent risks which can be evaluated and opportunities for labour productivity in 
project selection.  Potential change orders are approached as opportunities for gain through 
negotiation.  At the adjudication stage margin aggression is evident in strategic adjustments or 
bid unbalancing.  Green (1986) identifies three categories of bid unbalancing: front end loading; 
individual rate loading; back end loading.  Green goes on to discuss the extent of implementation 
of these techniques in practice.   
 
 
STRATEGIC DECISIONS IN CONTRACT BIDDING 
 
Numerous researchers have underlined the strategic significance of contract bidding (eg., 
Hillebrandt, 1977; Fellows et al., 1988; and Skitmore, 1989).  As previously suggested, contract 
bidding is essentially concerned with decision-making.   
 Sheldon (1982) suggests that in its simplest form, the decision problem facing the bidder, in 
the construction scenario, relates to the mark-up of the bid, over and above the estimated cost.  
This basic concept underlies the rationale for the bid adjudication process, and supports 
McCaffer and Baldwin's (1986) description of the bid adjudication meeting as the review of the 
cost estimate and finalisation of the contract price for preparation of the bid documents for 
subsequent submission.   
Sheldon adds, however, that such a basic conceptualisation of the bidding problem assumes that 
a decision to bid has already been made.  Hence a more general perception outlines two principal 
problems facing the bidder.  Ahmad (1988) focuses this concept, suggesting that contract bidding 
may be classified as two distinct but interrelated decision-making stages, namely; (1) the bid/no 
bid decision; and (2) the percentage mark-up decision or adjudication decision. 
 Collectively these two decision stages represent the firms project selection decisions which 
Skitmore (1989) suggests as being a vital and recurring decision for contracting organisations.   
 
Bid/No Bid Decision 
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The first stage of the problem of bidding is suggested, by Ahmad as being a binary decision 
problem; whether to bid or not to bid.  This decision depends on the overall worth of the project, 
the position and goals of the firm and the prevailing market conditions.  As previously discussed, 
Harris and McCaffer (1989) propose that this decision may be made at one of three stages in the 
contract bidding process.   
 
Adjudication/Mark-up Decision 
The second stage of bidding decision-making is the selection of mark-up.  Ahmad suggests that 
the mark-up is based on the estimated cost of the project and is expressed as a percentage of this 
cost, the mark-up itself contains the intended profit and a prorated portion of the general 
overhead expenses.  This view is one largely supported within literature, however other 
researchers have additionally suggest that the allowance for profit may also include an element 
for general risks eg., Harris and McCaffer (1989).  Depending on the influence of uncertainties 
arising from; the competitive situation; estimate accuracy; and contingency expenditures and in 
addition, the ability to evaluate risks, the outcome may fall within any of three ranges; (1) loss; 
(2) break-even ie., meet overhead requirements; and (3) profit.  The outcome on each bid may 
have a different perceived value to different bidders depending on their subjective attitude and 
perception of their own environmental situation. 
 Ahmad and Minkarah (1988b), in a questionnaire survey of 400 US contracting firms, suggest 
that these two unique decision stages are governed by almost identical decision rules and factors. 
 They add that the principal difference between the two decision would appear to be that of 
emphasis placed on the factors involved. 
 
 
THE DECISION ENVIRONMENT 
 
The bidding process, including specific bid adjudication decisions, is the result of a complex 
decision-making process.  The complexity arises from the inherent characteristics and 'imperfect 
knowledge' (see Skitmore, 1989:103) endemic to the construction bidding scenario.  Ahmad and 
Minkarah (1988) outline the following attributes of the problem as being primarily responsible 
for its complexity: 
 
•Competitive situation 
•Uncertainty in the estimated cost 
•Unpredictability of the construction site 
difficulties 
•Value difference amongst the components (profit or loss, general overhead etc.) of mark-up 
 
These attributes give rise to the aspects of uncertainty and risk associated specifically with 
contract bidding problems and contribute to the low profit margins and high failure rates found 
within the construction industry (Park, 1979).  Skitmore (1989:127) suggests that the effects of 
imperfect knowledge introduces the necessity to consider more indirect influences on bidding 
decisions. 
 The contract bidding decision environment is considered here on two levels: (1) the 
'contextual' environment of the firm; and (2) the 'bidding' environment, ie., the environment 
directly associated with bidding/adjudication decisions. 
 
Contextual Decision Environment 
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The contextual environment has been reduced to five principal factors by Bahrami (1981).  The 
factors identified as principally affecting the background environment of the firm were as 
follows: 
 
• economic factors 
• political factors 
• technological factors 
• legal and legislative factors 
 
A similar set of environmental factors has been identified by Eastham (1986).  These factors are 
further discussed by Skitmore (1989:110).   
 
Bidding Decision Environment 
Skitmore (1989) proposes a model of the contract bidding project decision system environment.  
This model outlines three principal type of 'decision machine' contributing to the project 
selection decision process.  Attributes directly associated with contract bidding and adjudication 
decisions are discussed under three general headings synonymous with Skitmore's decision 
machines: (1) project decision machine; (2) organisation decision machine; and (3) marketing 
decision machine.  These headings are supported by Ahmad (1988), who proposes a similar 
classification in a hierarchical grouping of bidding attributes.  Ahmad's classification however, 
discusses a fourth dimension, 'resources'.  The nature of the attributes associated with these 
classifications are discussed here under the three headings proposed by Skitmore, as described in 
Fig 5.3. 
 
 Fig 5.3: Factors affecting bidding decisions 
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1Project related attributes are those directly associated with the particular contract in 
consideration.  This includes attributes related to the: design and construction; direct costs 
and resources; and commercial aspects of any one bid.  This information is largely 
contained within the estimators summary reports. 
 
2Organisational related attributes are those factors relating to the strategic operation of the 
organisation, as a whole, which are directly and indirectly affected by bidding decisions. 
 
3Market related attributes are the external factors relating to bidding decisions, over which 
the contractor has no direct control. 
 
Risk and Preference In Adjudication Decisions 
Ahmad (1988) and later De Neufville and King (1991), in examination of the mark-
up/adjudication decision, discuss factors associated with the three attribute groups in terms of: 
(1) uncertainty and probability; and (2) preference and utility. 
Fig 5.4. describes the relationship of the three attribute groups with these two aspects of 
adjudication decisions, and in addition the process of mark-up selection, as influenced by these 
factors. 
 Fig 5.4: Probability and Utility in Bidding Decisions 
 
 Risk and uncertainty are generally assessed in terms of probability of outcome.  The 
adjudication decision is highly influenced by factors relating to the assessment of uncertainties 
and risk.  Generally it is the decision makers' judgement in assessing the probability of these, 
largely project related factors (eg., degree of difficulty, degree of hazard, uncertainty in cost 
estimate, competition, etc.), that dictates the final outcome environment, ie., loss, meet 
overheads, or profit. 
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 Preference is evaluated in terms of subjective value, or utility, and the causal effect any one 
project has on the preference related attributes (eg., need for work, type of job, current workload, 
profitability, economic conditions etc.).   
 
 
ADJUDICATION DECISION MODELS 
 
Decision models in contract bidding have typically assumed the form of mathematical models 
focusing on the production of optimal bidding strategies for contracts.  These models tend to 
evade the wider issues, both quantifiable and unquantifiable, that influence the contractor's 
bidding adjudication decisions (Lange, 1973).  The initial requirement here, is for a model that 
reflects the adjudication decision environment, in particular the type and extent of available 
information and its relation to the adjudication decision makers' decision processes. 
 In the previous chapter the basic elements of the decision-making process were examined, and 
a general decision model outlined (Fig 4.3).  This basic model is now fused with the aspects of 
bidding adjudication decision-making discussed above.  The resulting model then, illustrated in 
Fig 5.5, represents a general conceptualisation of the decision process and information flow 
relating to bidding adjudication decisions. 
 Fig 5.5. Adjudication information flow and decision criteria 
 
 
COMPETITIVE BIDDING - REVIEW OF ANALYTICAL MODELS 
 
Studies relating to the analysis of bidding strategy date back as far as the 1950s.  Consequently 
there is a large body of contradictory research within the literature relating to this field.  The 
object of most of the research has been to develop a model which will predict the probability of 
winning in the competitive bidding scenario endemic to the construction industry.  Other 
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researchers have tried to derive an 'optimum mark-up' that will, in the long term produce the 
maximum profit. 
 
Friedman and Gates 
The seminal competitive bidding strategy model was developed by Friedman (1956) and was 
bases around maximising the bidder's monetary value.  This model is further elaborated by a 
series of researchers (Park, 1966; Rosenshine, 1972; Fuerst, 1976; Ioannou, 1988).   
 In its most basic form , it is assumed that the contractor is bidding on one contract, with the 
objective of maximising the expected profit of bid 'b', given that the winning bid is selected on 
the basis of price; non-price factors are implicitly assumed not to affect the decision function.  
Therefore if P(b) is the probability that a bid of b will be the lowest and hence secure the 
contract, expected profit of bid b, E(b), can be expressed as: 
 
 E(b) = P(b) (b-c).   Where c = estimated cost 
 
Therefore the profit maximising bidder will choose that bid that maximises E(b). 
 The problem for the bidder then, is to calculate P(b), the probability of bid b being the lowest, 
and hence the winning bid.  Friedman (1956) suggests that P(b) can be calculated by studying 
the previous bidding patterns of actual and potential competitors.  Harris and McCaffer (1989) 
describe this method as follows: 
 
1data are collected on bids tendered by a particular competitor on past contracts in which 
contractor x has competed with him; 
 
2each competitor's bid is divided by the estimated cost of contractor x; 
 
3the data is grouped and a histogram plotted.  This histogram represents a picture of this 
competitor's historical performance against contractor x.  This histogram is usually 
converted into a cumulative frequency curve, as shown in Fig 5.6, with scales that show a 
direct relationship between contractor x's intended mark-up and the probability of beating a 
particular competitor. 
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 Fig 5.6: Probability of beating competitor x vs. mark-up 
 
Thus if the bidder knows the identity of the n other bidding firms, assuming that their past 
bidding behaviour is a good indicator of their present behaviour, the probability of beating each 
rival bidder can be calculated.  Hence the joint probability of beating n bidders, ie., the expected 
profit, is expressed by Friedman (1956) as follows: 
 
 E(b) = P(b)1 x P(b)2 ..........  x P(b)n  (b-c)  
 
If the identity of competing bidders is not known, Friedman postulates that the probability of b 
being the lowest bid would have to be calculated on the basis of an average probability.  In this 
case expected profit would be: 
 
  
 
 
 
If the bidding firm had an idea of how many unknown competing firms were bidding for the 
same contract, the probability of success of b would be the squared, cubed, etc.  value of the 
average probability of beating one unknown competitor, hence expected profit would become: 
 
 
 
 
 
 Where k = estimated number of unknown competitors. 
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This analysis of bidding has formed the basis of much of the subsequent work on bidding 
strategy. 
 A parallel family of models is set forth by Gates (1967) and similarly elaborated by others 
(Baumgarten, 1970; Rosenshine, 1972; Dixie, 1974) as well as by Gates (1976).  Gate's model is 
again based on the collection of historical data and the creation of a distribution of competitor's 
bids against a contractor's cost estimates.  Friedman's model implies that there is no uncertainty 
in the opponent's cost estimates by assuming that, for a particular project, the estimated cost is 
the same for all bidders.  Uncertainty is due only to the difference in the mark-up values.  On the 
other hand, Gates assumes just the opposite, arguing that in the construction industry uncertainty 
is mainly due to variation in cost estimates, not in the mark-up.  For a more detailed comparison 
of the two models see Benjamin and Meador (1979). 
 
 
Utility Functions 
Benjamin (1969), and later Willenbrock (1973), introduce the concept of utility to the basic 
models of bidding.  This basically involves a method of constructing a bidder's 'utility' function 
that gives a value or utility to the money a bidder expects to earn from a contract.  Then the 
expected utility, instead of expected mark-up/profit, is maximised.  Consideration of the wider 
factors such as size of project and the bidder's subjective attitude to risk are implicit in the utility 
function. 
 Other researchers have explored the application of similar multi-attribute utility function 
approaches to the bidding problem (eg., Fellows and Langford, 1980; Ibbs and Crandall, 1982; 
Ahmad, 1988; and Kidd and Prabhu, 1990).  In simplistic terms these approaches estimate values 
of individual criteria by relying mainly on the decision maker's judgement.  Consequently these 
approaches acknowledge the fact that mathematics is unlikely to supersede judgement entirely, 
in relation to bidding decisions, a view supported by Harris and McCaffer (1989:252).  Multi-
criteria decision analysis provides a framework for choosing among alternative courses of action 
when the outcomes resulting from these alternatives are clouded by imprecision and uncertainty. 
 Probability theory is applied to allow the decision maker to make maximum use of the 
information available, while utility theory guarantees that the choice will reflect the decision 
maker's true preferences.  Studies by Bengtsson (1985) support the use of such an approach.  
Bengtsson's work failed to reveal any single unambiguous goal and suggested that multiple 
objectives are required if the relations of an organisation to the environment are to be understood. 
 A comprehensive analysis of the theories and findings related to utility theory and multi-
attribute analysis can be found in Keeney and Raiffa (1976). 
 
Relating Cost Estimating Accuracy to Bidding Models 
Whittaker (1970) and Barnes and Lau (1974) are in accord that cost estimating accuracy is one of 
the principal variables controlling the probability of producing a winning bid.  Consequently 
numerous researchers (eg., Neil, 1978; Ashworth and Skitmore, 1983; and Abdel-Razek, 1987) 
have examined the nature of estimating accuracy in some detail.  Harris and McCaffer (1989) ask 
the question: "If output varies from 50% to 200% around the mean of 100%, how accurate can 
any estimator be in forecasting the cost of a contract?" 
 Given the nature of the problem facing the cost estimating department, different estimators are 
liable to produce a range of cost estimates.  Assuming that a contract has a 'likely cost' (Harris 
and McCaffer, 1989:256) the range of cost estimates produced by each company will be: 
 
 Cost estimate range = likely cost ± A%  
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Where A% is a measure of the accuracy of present cost estimating methods. 
 Harris and McCaffer (1989:256) use this simplification to explain why contractors' achieved 
profit/turnover is significantly less than the average of the profit margins added to the cost 
estimates at the tender stage.  Harris and McCaffer refer to this phenomena as 'the margin lost in 
competition'.  This theory suggests that the winning bid is normally based on a bid which is 
probably less than the likely cost, as a result of estimating inaccuracy.  Consequently the 
achieved mark-up on the contract is generally less than the mark-up included in the bid.  Over a 
large number of contracts the average difference between the mark-up included in bids and 
achieved mark-up is the average difference between the likely cost and the estimated costs.  
Harris and McCaffer refer to this average difference as the 'breakeven mark-up'.   
 Thus if a contractor did not wish to make a profit but wanted merely to break even and 
attempted to do so by including a zero profit mark-up in his bids, he would, because of 
estimating inaccuracies, make a net loss over a number of contracts.  In order to break even over 
the long term he would have to apply a profit mark-up grater than zero to compensate for 
estimating inaccuracies.  The mark-up needed to break even depends on (1) the general level of 
estimating accuracy and (2) the number of competitors. 
 Harris and McCaffer (1989:263) conclude that: 
 
•the achieved profit margin will be increased if the accuracy of cost estimating is improved 
•if the cost estimating accuracy is improved and the contractor wishes to maintain the same 
turnover, he will need to (a) reduce his applied profit margin or (b) increase the number of 
bids he tenders or (c) make some reduction in his applied profit margin and also increase 
the number of bids he tenders 
•the achieved profit margins will be grater than the original profit margins when all 
contractors improve their estimating accuracy.  This assumes that contractors fix their 
mark-up without reference to the current profitability of the company.  However, the 
competitive nature of the industry would probably cause contractors to cut their margins 
once enhanced profitability had been achieved.  It is difficult to assess this effect but at least 
one residual benefit would remain, namely the reduction in loss making contracts 
•there are serious consequences for any contractor who allows the accuracy of his cost 
estimating to deteriorate 
 
Constraints On Use In Current Practice 
Several surveys (eg., Lansley, 1983) indicate that contractors do not favour the use of 
mathematical models.  Researchers at Brunel University (Langford and Wong, 1979) found that 
all but a few of the largest contractors still use the traditional approach of experience, judgement 
and intuition.  The general view seems to be that mathematical and statistical models are being 
ignored primarily because of the fundamental assumptions made in their development. 
 Models based on the seminal works of Friedman (1956) and Gates (1967) assume that the 
only objective of a construction firm is to maximise the margin of bid over cost ie., profit, 
coupled with a simultaneous consideration of only one source of uncertainty that arises from the 
competitive situation.  A study by Ahmad and Minkarah (1988) revealed that "... in both bid/no-
bid decisions and percent mark-up decisions, many other factors are considered to be more 
important than just competition and profitability."  In addition Park (1962) has criticised these 
approaches expressing concern with the basic assumption that competitors will follow the same 
general bidding patterns in the future as they have in the past. 
 In general it may be suggested that these models involve overly simplistic assumptions about 
what people want and how they make decisions. 
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 De Neufville and King (1992) suggest that models applying utility and multi-attribute analysis 
are more realistic and underscore the fact that more factors affect bid decisions than allowed for 
in the univariate Friedman (1956) and Gates (1967) models.  However, models including utility 
still do not overcome the reliance upon the use of distributions of past bid results to determine 
how competitors might bid on future projects. 
 
 
ASPECTS OF AN ADJUDICATION DECISION SYSTEM 
 
Referring to our basic adjudication decision model, as illustrated in Fig 5.5, we can identify some 
fundamental requirements for the development of an effective adjudication decision system.  
Primarily the requirement is for a system that deals with the wider internal and external 
environments, both on a qualitative and quantitative basis.  Such a system subtends the 
philosophies of an array of goals other than just pure economic (Toffler, 1971; Johnson and 
Scholes, 1984; Skitmore, 1989). 
 The failure of mathematical optimisation models to replace managerial judgement suggests 
the need for a system that can inform the decision maker of the likely effects of decisions 
formulated by his own judgements and perceptions, a view supported by Wagner (1971).  
Similarly Cusack (1981) suggests that there is no shortage of available data, what is lacking is a 
quick and accurate method of analysis enabling evaluation of the alternative solutions.   
 Levinson (1953) and later Skitmore (1989) suggest the use of a combination of formal and 
informal methods.  The more structured aspects of the decision problem are dealt with by 
quantitative formulation.  These sub-optimised solutions can then be considered by the decision 
maker together with the more unstructured aspects of the problem.  The decision is therefore 
based partly on basic analytical techniques, on other information produced by the system but also 
on the judgement and intuition of decision makers. 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
The general principles and practice of contract bidding and adjudication decisions have been 
discussed and a general model of the processes associated with contract bidding is outlined. 
Contract bidding has been identified as an essential component in the strategic performance of 
the contracting organisation.  This aspect of bidding decisions is made clear in analysis of the 
strategic and tactical objectives of the contracting firm in bidding. 
 Two principal decision stages are identified: (1) bid/no-bid decisions; and (2) mark-
up/adjudication decisions.  These decisions are made by management in the endemic scenario of 
risk and uncertainty associated with contract bidding.  Attributes and factors associated with 
contract bidding, and in particular adjudication decisions, are discussed in terms of three groups: 
(1) project related attributes; (2) firm related attributes; and (3) market related attributes.  
Collectively these attributes are evaluated in terms of risks and preferences in reaching an 
'optimal solution' to the bid/no bid and mark-up decisions. 
 A conceptual model of the adjudication decision scenario has been evolved from the general 
decision model outlined in the previous chapter.  This model encompasses the wider aspect of 
the adjudication decision scenario, and in addition information sources and flow associated with 
adjudication decisions. 
 The numerous analytical models and techniques reviewed have been largely ignored by 
construction decision makers.  Such models have, understandably, failed to replace decision 
makers' own judgement and intuition in bidding decisions. 
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 The chapter end with a discussion of the general requirements of a system to support the 
adjudication decision scenario outlined in the conceptual model.  The principal requirements of 
such a system are as follows: 
 
•evaluation should not be restricted to just pure economic factors 
•information from both internal and external sources should be incorporated 
•both quantitative and qualitative information should be supported 
•provide analytical support for the more structured aspects of the decision problem 
•provide suitable information to support judgement and intuition for the more unstructured 
aspects 
•the system should facilitate 'what if?' analysis of alternative solutions 
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6The Background Study: Computer Based Information 
Systems for Decision Support 
  
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Bonczek et al (1981:18), in examining the CBIS environment, conclude that '... there is no clear 
breaking point between any two adjacent areas ...  where it can be said that one ends and the 
other begins'. 
 Traditionally such systems have all been regarded as systems covered by the generic term of 
'Information Systems' or 'Computer Based Information Systems' (Senn, 1990; Parker and Al-
Utaibi, 1985; Watson and Hill, 1983). 
 
 
CONCEPT OF MANAGEMENT SUPPORT SYSTEMS 
 
 Fig 6.1: Organisational management support systems 
 
 
Scott Morton (1984) introduced the concept of 'Management Support Systems' (MSSs), defining 
them as 'the use of Information Technologies to support management'.  Finlay (1990a) advocates 
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the use of the concept of MSS as a generic description with the caveat that the term can 
encompass systems that do not rely on IT. 
 It is suggested that the term MSSs be adopted as a collective description of systems providing 
data, information and intelligence or assistance to the cognitive constructs and processes of 
managers and decision makers, thus including: 
 
• electronic data processing systems (EDP) 
• management information systems (MIS) 
• decision support systems (DSS) 
• executive information systems (EIS) 
 
The nature of the relationship between these four principal types of management support system, 
together with their principal functions, is illustrated in Fig 6.1.  All four technologies can be 
viewed as unique classes of MSSs, however they are often interrelated in an evolutionary 
manner. 
 
 
EIS and DSS - AN INTEGRATED TECHNOLOGY 
 
The semantics and taxonomies of ESS and related EIS and DSS technologies are not of direct 
interest to this paper.  However, given the relative obscurity of these technologies in construction 
information management a brief outline is given below. 
 Fig 6.2 contrasts the principal characteristics and relationship of DSS and EIS technologies, 
the cornerstones of the ESS technology. 
 
 Fig 6.2: Contrasts between Decision Support Systems and 
 Executive Information Systems 
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 Watson et al (1991) have collated from previous research the following principal 
characteristics of EIS: 
 
• tailored to individual executive users 
• extract, filter, compress, and track critical data 
• provide on-line status access, trend analysis, exception reporting, and "drill-down" (drill-
down allows the user to access supporting detail or data that underlie summarized data) 
• access and integrate a broad range of internal and external data 
• are user-friendly utilising graphical interfaces, touch screen and mouse driven technology 
• are used directly by executives without intermediaries 
• present graphical, tabular, and/or textual information 
 
The term "executive support system", however, usually refers to a system with a broader set of 
capabilities than the basic EIS (Rockart and Delong, 1988).  The ESS may be seen as an 
integration of EIS, DSS and other support capabilities (E-mail, computer conferencing etc.).  For 
our scenario the ESS technology may be conceptualised as the addition of the following 
capabilities to EISs: 
 
• data analysis and modelling 
• ad-hoc access to data 
• flexible use of analytic tools 
 
Once associated only with top executives, such systems are now able to run in PC LAN 
environments broadening EIS/ESS use to middle-level managers, fostering the philosophy that 
the more a piece of information is shared among different users, the more utility it has. 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
This chapter has reviewed the principal modes of computer based support for management 
decision-making.  Four primary groups of system have been identified, however these four types 
of system would appear to have overlapping boundaries when operating in an organisational 
environment. 
 The concept of an integrated technology, combining the features of decision support systems 
and executive information systems has been explored.  Such a fusion provides a powerful range 
of tools for use by senior management to support decision-making: 
 
• tailored to individual executive users 
• extract, filter, compress, and track critical data 
• provide on-line status access, trend analysis, exception reporting, and "drill-down" (drill-
down allows the user to access supporting detail or data that underlie summarized data) 
•  access and integrate a broad range of internal and external data 
• are user-friendly utilising graphical interfaces, touch screen and mouse driven technology 
• are used directly by executives without intermediaries 
• present graphical, tabular, and/or textual information 
• data analysis and modelling 
• ad-hoc access to data 
• flexible use of analytic tools 
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Referring back to the aspects of an adjudication decision system, outlined in the previous 
chapter, it would appear that such a hybrid 'executive support system' (ESS) supports many of 
the requirements discussed.  It would seem logical therefore, that  
ESSs may be the solution to supporting the adjudication decision process. 
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7Empirical Study and Evaluation 
  
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter opens with a description of the nature and method of the empirical study.  This is 
followed by a more detailed analysis of the principal observations made during the analysis. 
 
 
DATA COLLECTION 
 
The empirical study was undertaken in two principal stages.  The initial first stage analysis was 
conducted in the form of semi-structured interviews.  The second stage of analysis involved a 
more detailed study, through passive observation, of the adjudication meetings on two live 
contracts within each of the two collaborating firms. 
 
Stage 1 Analysis 
A period of two week was spent working permanently in the cost estimating departments of the 
two participating contracting firms.  The objective of this period was to broadly examine the 
general context of the adjudication scenario i.e., the contract bidding process, and subsequently 
the general nature of the bid adjudication process.  The initial objective was to identify the 
principal participants of the contract bidding strategic decision process and their general 
responsibilities.  This information, in both instances, was obtained in the initial induction 
meeting held with the estimating director (firm 1) and estimating manager (firm 2). 
 Semi-structured interviews were conducted with each of those individuals (or groups of 
individuals) principally involved in the contract bidding decision process.  Table 7.1 summarises 
the principal observations made relating to the participants and their roles in the contract bidding 
process. 
 In addition to those listed in Table 7.1 interviews were conducted with the information 
systems managers of each of the two firms.  The objective here was to get some background on 
the current state and proposed direction of the two firms' information systems. 
 The differences between the two firms highlighted in Table 7.1. were found to be principally 
the result of their different organisational structures.  Firm B has a much flatter organisational 
structure than firm A, having not yet devolved to regional management.  Hence the managing 
director of firm B tended to take a much more hands-on approach to management than the 
managing director of firm A. 
 In addition to collecting this basic information, an attempt was also made in the interviews to 
develop a picture of the general objectives and goals of the organisation and its adjudicators. 
 
Stage 2 Analysis 
The second stage of analysis involved the observation of two live adjudication meetings within 
each of the collaborating firms.  The objective here was to gain a detailed 
 
 FIRM A: PARTICIPANT  FIRM A: PRINCIPAL ROLE  FIRM B: PARTICIPANT  FIRM B: PRINCIPAL ROLE 
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 Managing Director (regional) Ultimate decision maker, generally only 
directly involved on larger/prestige 
projects or if problems occur.  Strategic 
rather than tactical i.e., specific decision 
role. 
 Managing Director Principal decision maker, generally 
responsible for all contract bidding 
decisions.  Adjudication decision 
maker. 
 Commercial Director As above, not normally involved in 
individual bidding decisions. 
 Commercial Director More significant role in bidding 
process than in firm A.  May be 
viewed as deputy to managing 
director, assumes his role in 
absence.  Co-ordinates with 
estimating manager and marketing 
director for project selection 
activities.  Involved in commercial 
evaluations of larger projects.   
 Estimating Director Principal bidding decision maker.  Co-
ordinates with other participants for 
adjudication decisions and project 
selection decisions. 
  
 Marketing Director Participates in project selection process, 
decides which projects to actively pursue 
from the project environment.  Co-
ordinates with estimating director, chief 
estimator and planning manager in 
selecting suitable contracts and 
forecasting project opportunities. 
 Marketing Director Participates in project selection 
process, decides which projects to 
actively pursue from the project 
environment.  Co-ordinates with 
commercial director and estimating 
manager in selecting suitable 
contracts. 
 Contracts Manager Decision support role in adjudication 
process, advises on contractual and 
general commercial issues. 
 Estimating Manager Responsible for co-ordinating 
estimators activities.  Assumes 
similar roles to those of estimating 
director and chief estimator in firm 
A.  Principal decision support role in 
bid adjudication decisions. 
 Estimating Team Perform the detailed analysis and 
preparation of the direct cost estimate 
and cost related summary documents 
for bid adjudication.  Provide the detail 
for adjudication decisions. 
 Estimating Team Perform the detailed analysis and 
preparation of the direct cost 
estimate and cost related summary 
documentsfor adjudication 
 Planning Manager Coordinates planning activities of 
planning engineers.  Not normally any 
decision role in adjudication process 
 Planning Manager Coordinates activities of planning 
engineers.  Not normally any 
decision role in adjudication 
process 
 Planning Engineers Prepare the detailed project schedules 
and programmes together with method 
statements and temporary works design 
 Planning engineers Prepare the detailed project 
schedules and programmes 
together with method statements 
and temporary works design 
 Sub-Contract Enq. Responsible for maintaining resource 
database (subcontractors and suppliers) 
and issuing enquiries on individual 
projects.  Project estimator performs 
evaluations of resource quotes. 
 Buyers Responsible for maintaining 
resource database (subcontractors 
and suppliers) and issuing 
enquiries on individual projects.  
Project estimator performs 
evaluations of resource quotes. 
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 Table 7.1: Participants and Principal Roles in Contract Bidding 
 
understanding of the processes and information used by decision makers in an adjudication 
meeting.  Appendix 1 contains detailed transcripts taken during these four sessions.   
 
 
DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
Having outline the method adopted and principal analysis of the empirical study, the following 
sections discuss the observations made, first relating to the bidding process in general and 
secondly, more specifically to the adjudication process. 
 
Overview of Bidding Decision Processes 
The scope of bidding activities is normally taken to cover the range of tasks that are carried out 
between the receipt of the bid documents, the decision of whether to tender a bid, and the point at 
which the bid is tendered to the client's representative (e.g., Fellows and Langford, 1980; 
McCaffer and Baldwin, 1986; Betts, 1990).  This definition of scope, although suitable for 
analysis of the functional aspects of bid preparation, was found in this research to be rather 
restrictive in examining the strategic decisions involved in bidding.  Here the evidence supports 
the view that there are two distinct strategic decision stages in the bidding process, (1) the 
decision to bid for a specific project and (2) bid adjudication, where the level of mark-up is 
decided (see also Ahmad and Minkarah, 1988).  It was also found that the decision to bid, or 
project selection decision, is often made long before receipt of the actual bid documents, and 
these two decisions, particularly the project selection decision, are made progressively, evolving 
iteratively over a period of time.  This is very much in line with the findings of Harris and 
McCaffer (1983) who suggest that the decision to bid is made at three distinct points in time, 
during pre selection, upon receipt of the bid documents and after preparation of the cost estimate. 
 Fig 7.1 shows the scope of definition for bidding decisions found to be suitable for this study.  
The figure also illustrates the progressive and iterative nature of bidding strategy decisions (cf., 
Hogarth, 1981). 
 
Strategic Planning and Bidding Policy 
It was found that the participating contractors operated a two tiered approach to corporate 
planning, as suggested by Skitmore (1989).  Both contractors operated under a medium term 
strategy plan, based on a five year period, and a short term, 2 year policy plan.  The medium term 
business plan is used to establish the general objectives of the managing directors and senior 
management for the strategic development of the firm, in consideration of the long term 
objectives.  These general objectives are filtered down into the 2 year plans which set out, 
amongst other things, the firms' general bidding policies aimed at satisfying the objectives 
established in the medium term plan. 
 The firms' bidding policies are formulated from monetary, market related and other objectives. 
 These objectives are analysed within the context of internal and external factors affecting the 
firms environment (cf., Bahrami, 1981 and Ansoff, 1984), in conjunction with information fed 
back in summary reports, outlining the general statistics of bid results and performance. 
 The general guidelines set down in the bidding policy determine targets for the amount and 
mix of future contract business, an acceptable level for the proportion of contracts won, and the 
average profit margin to be achieved on contracts (see also Ward and Chapman, 1988). 
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 These policy rules and criteria are interpreted and regulated by the decision makers involved 
in project selection and bid adjudication decisions in consideration of the individual merits and 
outcomes of specific project opportunities.   
 
 Fig 7.1: Overview of strategic decision process in tendering 
 
 
The Project Selection Process - Bid/No bid Scenario 
Of the two strategic decision stages identified, the project selection decision process proved the 
most difficult to delineate as a result of its complex and progressive nature.  The procedure and 
process of project selection decisions within both the contracting firms was ill-defined and 
discursive.  In this respect Fig 4.1 represents a somewhat idealistic interpretation of this stage ie., 
the model outlined was not followed rigorously, but forms the general processes involved.  In 
many cases the decision to bid is made prior to receipt of the bid documents, largely as a result of 
marketing activity.  The scope of marketing activity and its influence on project selection were 
observed to be far more significant than suggested in earlier works (eg., Lansley et al., 1979 and 
Sidwell, 1984), a view supported by Fisher (1989).  
 The marketing departments within the contracting firms were well established and consisted 
of both business development (sales) and research activities.  The source of project selection 
decisions stems from a pool of project opportunities existing in what we term the project 
generating environment.  Knowledge relating to the possibilities and characteristics of such 
project opportunities is sustained through active marketing relationships with existing clients, 
personal contacts and other historical information, and through a variety of external stimuli.  
These external stimuli take the form of a variety of published information (eg., trade papers and 
journals, records of planning applications, NEDO forecasts etc.), externally compiled market 
research (eg., ABI and Glennigan), personal contact with the leading property, insurance and 
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investment companies and also regular contact with design team consultancies (cf., Jepson and 
Nicholson, 1972:51, Rajab, 1981 and Harris and McCaffer, 1983:182-8). 
 From this stream of project opportunities a pool of projects are selected which best fit the 
hierarchal existence, relatedness and growth needs of the firm (Alderfer, 1972), and the 
objectives of the corporate strategy plan and bidding policy.  Project selection at this stage was 
observed to be extremely subjective and lacking in any structured approach.  However, a number 
of factors may be identified which were considered to affect the outcome of such project 
selection decisions, in conjunction with the corporate bidding policy.  These factors are grouped 
under three distinct but inter-related headings: 
 
• Job or project related factors 
• Firm related factors 
• Market related factors 
 
Coincidentally, these sets of factors are identical to the factors considered at the bid adjudication 
stage.  However, the level of detail is far coarser and the tradeoffs and emphasis of the factors are 
different.  Following this decision stage the selected projects are tracked and efforts are made by 
business development teams whose primary task is to secure a place on the 
prequalification/tendering list. 
 At this stage certain projects emerge as having a greater potential utility to the firm than others 
or there may be a particular corporate interest in a specific project.  Consequently at this stage the 
potential utility, together with the anticipated tender dates and workload, is discussed in regular 
meetings between the marketing, cost estimating, planning and buying departments of the 
company1.  Such meetings are generally production oriented.  Within both firms, however, the 
access and utilisation of the necessary information was poor, although the information needed 
was generally available.  The result of these meetings is a report scheduling the likely tender 
dates of selected projects and, in the case of one of our collaborating firms, an alphabetical 
priority ranking of each project.  These priorities and anticipated tender dates are constantly 
reviewed as new project opportunities enter into the system.   
 Formal invitations to tender bids then may be received as expected (eg as a result of successful 
prequalification) or just 'out of the blue', ie., without any prior knowledge or marketing activity.  
One of the firms suggested that up to 35% of invitations are a result of such ad hoc requests.  
Upon receipt of the bid documents, a formal bid decision is made based on the more detailed 
information contained in the bid documents.  Corporate policy and the four groups of factors are 
considered at this stage in finer detail -  the detail of the evaluation generally being proportional 
to the value of that particular project.  Both firms then complete a formal record of the bid 
decision. 
 
Preparation of the Bid Documents 
Preparation of the bid documents commences following a positive decision to tender a bid for a 
project.  Although the preparation of bids is a complex process, as shown by Betts (1990), very 
little corporate strategic input occurs at this stage, other than purely profit or cash flow related 
considerations.  There were some differences however between the two collaborating firms 
concerning the role of the estimator in making strategic financial decisions during the cost 
                     
    1In general, 75% of the project opportunities involve the contractors in some formal prequalification procedure 
prior to their being invited to tender a bid.  In this case, information relating to (1) the project, client and clients 
representative and (2) the available and suitable personnel is necessary to put together a suitable prequalification 
team, is needed. 
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estimating process.  For one firm, emphasis was placed on standardisation and continuity in 
preparation of the cost estimates and project schedules.  Any possible bid unbalancing or other 
such profit related decisions were presented and discussed at the bid adjudication stage.  For the 
other firm however, the estimators identified and implemented profit and cash flow related 
unbalancing policies, which were later in the adjudication meeting.  The utility of each project 
and its anticipated bid schedule were continually reviewed throughout the bid preparation stage 
as new opportunities occurred.   
 
The Bid Adjudication Process 
The completed cost estimate breakdown, schedule and other various reports relating to the bid to 
be tendered were presented to senior management for adjudication in a bid adjudication meeting. 
 The cost estimate was evaluated in consideration of the four groups of factors (ie., job related, 
resource related, market related and firm related) in conjunction with corporate bidding policies.  
Adjustments for overheads, risk and profit were then made to the bid on the basis of these 
considerations.  Any late quotes or increased costs were also dealt with at this stage along with 
any necessary revenue recovery analysis. 
 This adjusted bid was then tendered to the clients representative who, for the successful 
bidder, issued an invitation to contract.  Even at this eleventh hour, the contractor may still 
decline the invitation.  In practice however such an event is extremely unlikely. 
 
Principles and Components of Adjudication Decisions 
 
Decision Environment 
Bid adjudication decisions, although more readily defined than project selection decisions, are 
still the result of a complex decision-making process.  These complexities are inherent in the 
nature of the problem and decision environment, ie., competitive situation, uncertainty in the 
estimated cost, elements of production risk and uncertainty, accelerated bidding periods and 
insufficiency and poor quality of information.  These complexities are amplified by the dynamic 
nature of the construction market and by the use of apparently irrational bidding policies in the 
face of reducing project opportunities, eg., 'buying in' work.   
 
Factors Considered 
Bid adjudication decisions, as previously noted, were observed to be largely subjective and 
intuitive - based on the decision makers experiences, judgements and perceptions - an 
observation supported in a questionnaire survey of bidding in construction by  Ahmad and 
Minkarah (1988).  Because of the time constraints involved in the bidding process, it is not 
possible for decision makers to identify and analyse all the related factors that might form the 
basis of such decisions.  The lack of any observed structured approach to bid adjudication 
decisions, however, results in only a small and inconsistent subset of the many possible factors 
that might be considered for each project.  As previously discussed, the factors relating to 
decisions in bid adjudication may be grouped under three inter-related headings.  Job related 
factors are those factors specific to each individual project, or type of project.  The majority of 
these factors are considered during bid preparation and the analysis presented in the bid 
adjudication meeting.  Market related factors cover the external environment of decision makers 
who are aware of their influence even if they did not always consider them specifically.  Firm 
related factors are closely associated with the corporate bidding policy and business plan of the 
company.  In bid adjudication, the aim was to assess the outcome effect of the project on the 
objectives outlined in the general corporate plan.  Again, these decision makers were aware of 
their influence even though they did not always consider them specifically. 
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 In the companies studied, bid adjudication decisions involved analysis, evaluation and 
preference tradeoffs of a largely indeterminate and inconsistent combination of these factors.  
The majority of the evaluations made were performed subjectively.  Cash flow modelling, risk 
estimation and other forecasting techniques were generally applied to only the largest projects, 
where the outcome effect was considered more carefully and results aggregated into corporate 
cash-flow requirements.   
 
Bias and Inconsistency of Decision Makers 
Bid adjudication was observed to be a quasi group decision-making process, although the final 
adjustment decisions were ultimately made by a single decision maker of corporate status.  The 
decision was highly dependent on the advice and recommendations of those present in the 
adjudication meeting who had been involved in preparation of the bid documents.  In general, the 
bid adjudication decision maker had little or no involvement in the production of the bid 
documents up to this stage.  The project estimators had the most significant influence on the final 
bid decision by outlining the perceived principal characteristics, risks and potential profit areas of 
the project.  Other parties with a lesser but still significant contribution were the planners, buyers 
and commercial/contract managers. 
 In addition to the personal biases of adjudicators, an element of inconsistency existed due to 
the estimator, planner etc,. being different for each bid.  The adjudicator is therefore also 
influenced by the biases and inconsistencies of a variety of human judgements, as suggested in 
numerous studies by Tversky and Kahneman. 
 The results of such biases and inconsistencies is that attention is focused on certain aspects a 
project more as a result of the personal biases of both decision maker and advisors than valid 
recognition of their intrinsic importance. 
 
Information Sources and Utilisation 
Information is a fundamental resource in decision-making.  It has been said that bidding is 
largely a problem of managing and co-ordinating information (Betts, 1990).  The information 
used by the decision maker in bid adjudication takes many forms, eg., reports and analyses 
formulated as part of the bid preparation process, subjective evaluation of project estimators, 
informal conversations with subcontractors and suppliers and miscellaneous information relating 
to the many internal and external factors stimulating the adjudication decision environment.   
 Very little value was placed by our collaborating companies on the analysis of historical 
information to support their adjudication decisions.  For example, although information on the 
historical performance of competing contracting firms was available, suggesting in some cases 
that a particular competitor was 'buying work' for instance, the information was rarely used as 
there was no guarantee that competitors would continue to behave in the same way in the future 
as in the past.  Despite this however, it was thought that it may be useful for decision makers to 
have access to information relating to the historical performance of the company's own bids for 
differing types of projects in different geographical locations. 
 In general, information relating to the keenness of competition is normally obtained through 
subcontractors, suppliers and other personal contacts, rather than through any form of analysis or 
statistical extrapolation.  Thus, feedback of information relating to the performance of bids is 
always incomplete - detailed information concerning the likely competition may be available for 
one auction, but not another. 
 The inconsistency and inaccuracy of information, particularly relating to competition has been 
the principle frustrations of the numerous probabilistic approaches to bidding models.  Such 
models are based on a series of interrelated assumptions that suggest that firstly there is an 
adequate supply of information on competitors bids, secondly, that competitors will continue to 
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bid as in the past and finally that there is no significant difference between the competitors' cost 
estimates (King and Mercer, 1988). 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
The empirical study evaluated the principal participants and their roles in the contract bidding 
adjudication process.  A detailed examination of adjudication decision-making processes 
revealed that such decisions are complex, involving a wide variety of economic and non-
economic factors.  This also applies to the objectives of the decision maker.  Generally such 
decisions are made by senior management, reflecting the significance of such decisions.  These 
decisions are made largely on the basis of experience, heuristics and intuition.  The information 
used in adjudication is principally related to project details, the bulk of the time being taken up in 
ratification of direct cost estimates and analysis of resource quotes. 
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8Strategic Information Modelling 
  
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this chapter is to develop a more structured view of the processes and information 
utilisation within the single aspect of bid adjudication.  The methodology adopted for this 
purpose and its application to the empirical study is described. 
 
 
METHODOLOGY - INFORMATION STRATEGY PLANNING 
 
 Martin's (1986) 'information strategy planning' (ISP) was also examined.  This is part a wider 
philosophy of 'information engineering' which follows a top-down approach to analysis.  ISP 
forms the top layer of the information engineering strategy.  Fig 8.1 shows the principal stages of 
the ISP methodology and sequence of analysis.  This identifies the key areas of the business and 
information entities and attributes used within each area.  The process allows the development of 
'strategic information models' without the rigours of more structured approaches such as 
SSADM. 
 
 Fig 8.1: ISP top-down analysis methodology 
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 Consequently the ISP methodology described was adopted for analysis of contract bidding 
adjudication and a series of models were produced representing the processes and information 
used by adjudication decision makers.   
 Many techniques are available for the structured analysis of systems and process information 
(eg Gane and Sarson, 1980; DeMarco, 1979; Ward and Mello, 1985; Yourdon, 1979; SSADM).  
The Gane and Sarson and SSADM methodologies were examined in detail as possible 
candidates for the structured analysis of the contract bidding adjudication process.  However, it 
soon became clear that these techniques are generally not suited to the semi-structured nature of 
adjudication decision-making processes.  These techniques are not easily applied to strategic 
decision processes, being suited more for the analysis of transaction processes.  The techniques 
proposed by Gane and Sarson (1980), for the analysis of data flow between entities 'data flow 
diagrams' (DFDs), was however found useful in producing an overview model. 
 
 
OVERVIEW MODEL - GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 
 
 Fig 8.2: Metastructure for tender adjudication goals and CSFs 
 
 Senior managers from each of the two collaborating firms were interviewed, starting from the 
lower level managers and working up to the most senior managers involved in adjudication 
decisions, ie., the adjudication decision makers.  At this stage informal semi-structured 
interviews were the main method employed to gain an initial overview of adjudication decisions, 
the internal organisation of the company and general management goals and requirements.  From 
these initial interviews a provisional model of adjudication decisions and processes was 
developed, within the context of the overall bidding process.  This 'metastructure' for bid 
adjudication goals, processes and critical success factors is illustrated in Fig 8.2. 
 These interviews also identified the following principal aims (general statements about 
direction without stating specific targets to be reached at a particular point in time) and 
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objectives (specific targets intended to be reached at a given point in time) associated with the 
firms bid adjudication strategy: 
 
•Reduce overheads associated with bidding 
•Increase profit margins on jobs 
•Increase bid success ratio 
•Meet corporate turnover requirements 
•Satisfy clients 
•Meet corporate overhead requirements 
•Reduce the number of claims (from clients and agents) 
•Increase throughput of bids 
 
The next stage involved a detailed analysis of the adjudication decision process on the two 'live' 
bids preparations within each of the participating firms.  All four of the projects analyzed were 
based on traditional lump sum contract apart from one design and build contract.  The transcripts 
of these meetings can be found in Appendix I. 
 From this more detailed overview study, a series of data flow diagrams (DFDs) were prepared 
based on the notation used in the Gane and Sarson (1980) methodology.  The DFDs represented 
three levels of detail: 
 
• Level 0 - Bidding procedure (Summary Level) 
• Level 1 - Bid adjudication (13.00) 
• Level 2 - Expansion of adjudication processes (13.01 - 13.07) 
 
The data flow diagrams, reproduced in Appendix II, model the processes associated with the bid 
adjudication.  The identified principal processes and decisions were then used as the basis for 
mapping the strategic information requirements of the adjudicator. 
 
 
CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS 
 
From our observations, the decision makers, in order to ensure competitive performance and 
achieve the bidding aims and objectives identified in the overview study, aimed to achieve 
satisfactory results in a certain number of key areas.  These specific areas, in which satisfactory 
results are paramount, are referred to here as the bid adjudication Critical Success Factors 
(CSFs). 
 The principal CSFs in bid adjudication were found to be: 
 
•Profitability of job 
•Optimisation of bids (Profitability vs competitiveness) 
•Risk assessment of bids 
•Optimisation of mark-up (overheads and profit vs competitiveness) 
•Accuracy of cost estimate 
•Meet or exceed specification requirements 
•Meet or improve on schedule requirements 
•Competitiveness of final bid value 
•Maximise potential resource discounts 
•Soundness of construction methods 
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CRITICAL DECISION/INFORMATION SET 
 
Associated with the achievement of these critical success factors are the critical 
decision/information sets.  The critical decisions, or processes relating to the bid adjudication are 
represented in the Level 1 and Level 2 DFDs.  These critical decisions are made on the basis of 
data from the 'critical information set'.  Together the critical decision and critical information sets 
formed the basis for the development of the strategic data model which is represented in the form 
of a matrix of decisions against information. 
 Appendix III contains a detailed analysis of information entities and attributes critical to 
adjudication decisions together with the principal sources of such information. 
 Appendix IV contains the series of entity/process matrices which map the many to many 
relationship of the adjudication processes identified in the DFDs and the associated critical 
information entities and attributes described in Appendix III. 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
Following several attempts to utilise a number of existing structured analysis type methodologies 
for mapping bidding adjudication processes it was found that a less structured approach was 
better suited.  The approach adopted facilitated the production of a series of models representing 
the strategic information used in supporting adjudication decisions. 
 These models can be used for the development of a conceptual structure for the proposed 
system.  The information attributes, represented in the strategic information models may then be 
translated to the architecture of a prototype system. 
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9Conceptual System Structure 
  
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Having developed models of the principal processes and information utilisation of the bid 
adjudication this chapter translates the structured analysis, described in the previous chapter, into 
a description for a prototype system architecture. 
 The general structure of a proposed system is discussed followed by a general analysis of its 
principal components. 
 
 
THE 'MULTIPLE SYSTEMS' APPROACH 
 
In contrast to the current trend towards the development of 'monolithic' integrated databases we 
propose the use of the more traditional 'multiple systems' approach of MIS (cf. Crow, 1990). 
 This approach recognises that the ideal 'integrated' system cannot be designed (Senn, 1990).  
The MIS multiple systems approach integrates information from identified functional area 
information systems (eg., planning, cost estimating, marketing, accounts) to provide an 
encyclopedia of details and information. 
 
 Fig 9.1: Metasystem of functional area information systems 
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 The multiple systems approach, as illustrated in Fig 9.1, may be parallelled with the 
"schematic diagram" of our own brain and nervous system (cf., Wooldridge, 1963).  Ergo, it is a 
metasystem of related but independent information systems 'building blocks' that interface with 
each other, yet operate separately.  These independent systems are often, however, organised into 
databases that are controlled to best meet all user requirements.  This provides a core of data that 
can be used by each of the functional area systems within the metasystem. 
 The adoption of this approach facilitates the use of information stored in existing systems and 
the flexibility to accommodate changes.  In addition the continual flow of information between 
departments and units makes it possible to coordinate and control the activities that occur in each 
one.   
 The conceptual structure of the proposed system, as represented in Fig 9.2 is based on such a 
multiple systems philosophy. 
 
 Fig 9.2: ESSTA - Conceptual system structure 
 
DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT 
 
LIGHTSHIP 3.0 (Pilot Executive Software) was selected as the controlling development 
environment, running under WINDOWS 3.0 for IBM DOS on a PC 386 platform with additional 
XGA graphic capabilities. 
 This shell is one of the only development packages designed to build and run EIS/ESS 
applications specifically for PCs and Local Area Network (LAN) based architectures.  
LIGHTSHIP is a relatively inexpensive tool for building such applications, normally associated 
with elaborate and expensive host based systems.  Running under WINDOWS 3.0, it provides an 
'object oriented' development approach utilising the WINDOWS Dynamic Data Exchange 
(DDE) protocol, multitasking capabilities and other WINDOWS features to draw data from 
workstations and servers on a LAN, as well as external on-line data.  Such features also allow 
LIGHTSHIP to interface to other software applications.  These features are employed to develop 
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the system structure, described in Fig 9.2.  For development of the prototype system, however, 
the connectivity problems of the LAN architecture are removed by the encapsulation of the 
whole LAN environment on a single PC.  This is achieved by the use of a series of 'dummy' 
databases representing the various distributed functional area systems.   
 
 
ESS CORE 
 
LIGHTSHIP, operating as the ESS core, assumes the role of the central processor, or brain, of 
the metasystem.  This core, utilising the techniques discussed above, 'sucks in' the relevant data, 
using either the WINDOWS DDE function or through an SQL request (flat files may also be 
used).  The data may then be viewed from a variety of perspectives, defined by the decision 
maker, using the 'drill-down', 'slice and dice' and 'multidimensional', characteristics of ESSs.  In 
addition the information can be analyzed using the core's integral analysis tool set or by paging 
out to subroutines for more sophisticated modelling functions. 
 Information is presented in pre-defined 'data-driven' screens, incorporating the use of icons 
and 'hot-spot' keys, with mouse driven selection, for user requests.  Although the flexibility of 
information retrieval and analysis is bounded, a tradeoff has been made in favour of icon driven 
use and instant graphical display of the information.   
 
 
DATABASES 
 
For the present prototype study, as previously suggested, it is necessary to artificially represent 
the LAN, or other, distributed environment by developing a series of 'dummy' databases 
representing the functional area information systems.  SUPERBASE 4 (SPC Software 
Publishing) was selected to develop these databases, being one of the best-selling WINDOWS 
compatible relational databases.  For the operational system data will be drawn, where possible, 
from existing information systems. 
 Databases will be constructed for each of the following functional area information systems 
using sample data taken from the two participating firms and other suitable external sources for: 
 
• cost estimating 
• planning 
• corporate (accounts etc.) 
• personnel 
• contracts 
• marketing 
• external sources 
 
 
STOCHASTIC SIMULATION 
 
The principal simulation and modelling functions supported by the system are: 
 
• cash flow forecasting 
• risk and sensitivity analysis 
• probable profit contribution and optimum bid modelling 
• simulation of project/corporate overhead requirements 
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• simulation of construction output trends (future workload) 
 
These functions, together with other text and data related information available from the system, 
serve to support and enhance the adjudication decision makers own cognitive abilities. 
 
 
SYSTEM VALIDATION 
 
The prototype system will be validated against live projects within the participating firms.  A 
qualitative evaluation of the utility of the system will be made, based on a comparison with the 
existing adjudication process. 
 
 
IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY 
 
The operational system will be implemented within the context of the contracting firms' own 
LAN, or similar, distributed environment.  Continuing the analogy of the ESS core to the 
mechanics of the brain, then the distributed network may be seen as the spinal cord of the 
metasystem.   
 Requests made from the core system will gather data, via this 'spinal cord', from the various 
internal and external information sources, as illustrated in Fig 9.2. 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
Using the information from the empirical study a conceptual system structure has been proposed. 
 This system is based on a 'collective system' approach.  In this approach the system core serves 
as a junction for the firms information systems, collating the infirmation and translating it to user 
friendly graphical output.  This information is then used by the adjudication decision maker, 
together with simple analytical tools, to enhance and support his bid adjudication decisions. 
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SUMMARY AND PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
The analysis conducted in the first phase of this research project has clearly identified the 
complex nature of strategic bidding decisions.  Such decisions can be related to two principal 
strategic functions, the decision to bid and adjudication/mark-up decisions.  Despite (or perhaps 
because of) the complexity and wide variety of factors involved in such decisions, they are still 
made largely on the basis of intuitive heuristic techniques.  Contractors rely on 'gut-feeling' and 
judgement to make decisions which ultimately affect the short and long term performance of the 
organisation.  The need for a more structured approaches to making both types of strategic 
bidding decision has been identified. 
 A study has been described involving interviews with two major construction companies and 
observations in four 'live' adjudication meetings.  A form of structure analysis was applied to the 
empirical study.  A form of structure analysis, based on information strategy principles, was 
applied and found to be more suitable than other, more inflexible, systems of structured analysis. 
 This analysis resulted in the production of a series of models describing the strategic information 
requirements of the adjudication decision maker.  From these basic models of the adjudication 
process and the information attributes used in support of adjudication decisions, a conceptual 
model of the required system was developed. 
 The methodology and development of a system aimed at supporting the decision maker in the 
contracting firms' bid adjudication decisions has been proposed in this report.  An ESS approach 
has been used to integrate and centralise the information and tools required to support such 
decisions.  This information is presented graphically via icon driven screens utilising user driven 
'hot-spot' keys.  The proposed system is aimed at supporting the information gathering and 
analysis stage of adjudication decisions.  The system is not, however aimed at replacing human 
judgement, its role is principally seen as information support. 
 
 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
Having developed a conceptual system architecture the second phase of the research is initiated.  
Phase 2 involves the development of the prototype system, based on the findings and strategic 
information model developed in the analysis stages of the phase 1 research.  Once at a suitable 
stage this system, together with its artificial microsystem representing the contracting firms' 
distributed information metasystem, will be introduced to the participating firms for iterative 
development.  In addition to the continued development of this particular research project several 
areas of potential research have been identified.  These areas have generally been considered 
within this research, however, as with most research, several of these topics have warranted 
much more attention than it was possible to give them. 
 This project has focused on one single aspect of one specific problem area, namely contract 
bidding.  The principles of information engineering, particularly in the early stage of information 
strategy planning, could be applied to the generic scenario of the construction firm.  The 
techniques described could be used to develop a strategic model of the aims, objectives, 
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functional areas, critical success factors, critical decisions and critical information relating to 
strategic management of the construction organisation.  In short a structured analysis of what 
makes the firm 'tick', in terms of information feedback.  Such models could be used to examine 
the nature of strategic information use by management with a view to creating a more generic 
executive information system.  This system could provide strategic decision makers with 
information critical to the strength of the firm. 
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 SUMMARY OF TENDER ADJUDICATION PROCEEDINGS 
 
Contractor 1 
 
C1-TA1 
 
JOB DESCRIPTION:Extension of existing hospital building. 
CLIENT:   Regional Health Authority. 
APPROX. VALUE:  £12 Million. 
TENDER SUBMISSION:Originally 17 September 1991, extended to 23 September 1991. 
 
 
16 September 1991 10.30 HRS 
PRESENT:  CHIEF ESTIMATOR 
  PROJECT PLANNING ENGINEER 
 
•The meeting started with an informal presentation, by the project planner, outlining the 
general nature of the project. This included analysis of the tender drawings and site 
photographs and surveys, assessing the nature of the site conditions and analysis of access 
and logistical points of interest. 
 
•Analysis of programme for the works. Assess scope for reduction in programme, ie., 
increased manpower and resources. Also potential for reduction of supervisory personnel. 
 
•Plant requirements, in particular lifting plant restrictions and risks, unsure of M&E weights 
and associated lifting requirements. General discussion of small plant requirements and 
logistical problems. 
 
11.15 HRS 
PRESENT: CHIEF ESTIMATOR 
  PROJECT ESTIMATOR 
 
•Looked at nominated and domestic subcontractor trades in general, ie., what subcontract 
packages have been sent out for inquiry. Subcontractor comparisons not complete at this 
stage, a sufficient number of quotes had not been received on some of the packages. 
 
•Commenced completion of the subcontractor quotes comparison sheets for each package in 
turn. Quotes compared against in house estimate. Initial task involved balancing of the 
quotes so that like is compared with like. Difficult at this stage as many of the quotes had 
not been received. 
 
•Looked at possible ways of reducing quoted figures such as potential discounts, using labour 
only with a cheaper materials supplier. Estimator spent a lot of time in telephone 
negotiations and clarifications with the subcontractors. 
 
•Much subjective evaluation of individual subcontractors based on previous experience and 
intuition was observed. No use was made of stored historical information. 
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13.00 HRS 
 
•Break for lunch. 
 
14.00 HRS 
PRESENT: CHIEF ESTIMATOR 
  PROJECT ESTIMATOR 
 
•Continued evaluation of available subcontractor quotes. 
 
14.45 HRS 
PRESENT: CHIEF ESTIMATOR 
  PROJECT ESTIMATOR 
  PROJECT CONTRACTS MANAGER 
 
•Analysis of preliminaries and supervisory requirements, scope for reduction. Ensure that 
supervisory personnel only on site for as long as required. 
 
•General discussion of potential for saving within the preliminaries section, eg., use of 
Portakabins from existing sites, alternative temporary works and electrics, metering 
electricity and water rather than percentage cost. 
 
•Other possible alternative for reduction in nett costs, eg., allocation of some preliminary items 
to the subcontractors responsibility such as groundwater pumping. 
 
•Logistics and maximisation of flexibility of plant requirements, mobile vs. fixed craneage. 
 
16.30 HRS 
 
•Decided to postpone rest of adjudication meeting until 18 September 1991 due to lack of 
response from subcontractors due to extension. 
 
18 September 1991 
09.30 HRS 
PRESENT: CHIEF ESTIMATOR 
  PROJECT ESTIMATOR 
 
•Analysis of late quotes received and completion of the subcontractor comparisons for each 
package. Again the major problem is in normalising the wide variation of quotes received to 
compare like with like. Quotes broken down to labour, plant and materials and compared 
with in house estimate to try to get a clearer picture. 
 
•Chief estimator, with advice of project estimator, selects a suitable subcontractor for each 
package from the quotes received. Not always the cheapest subcontractor was selected, 
estimators use heuristic judgement to assess the risks and uncertainties of the various 
subcontractors. Chief estimator may allocate a capital percentage sum for risk in some 
circumstances. 
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•Subcontractor summary sheet and preliminaries analysis are completed together with the 
adjustments to nett cost summary sheet. A finance sheet is prepare which summarises the 
nett cost of the project as perceived by the estimators. 
 
11.50 HRS 
PRESENT: CONTRACTS DIRECTOR 
  ESTIMATING DIRECTOR 
  CHIEF ESTIMATOR 
  PROJECT ESTIMATOR 
  PROJECT CONTRACTS MANAGER 
 
•Brief introduction of project. 
 
•General synopsis of possible competitors compiled from a combination of sources. 
 
•Outlined changes to specification on specific packages where risk elements identified. Ensure 
subcontractor quotes in compliance with specified requirements. 
 
•Chief estimator outlined subcontractor responses in general and outlined major risk elements. 
Detailed analysis of subcontractors selected, reasons for selection and confidence in quote. 
Risk analysis based on the spread and soundness of the quotes submitted. Also relationship 
with subcontractor on historical and current projects. 
 
•Contract manager raises personal objection to individual subcontractor as being unreliable on 
a previous project. Generally, there was a continued emphasis on the relationship and 
experience with individual subcontractors. 
 
•Analysis of the preliminaries and outlined principal project peculiarities affecting the 
preliminaries. Contracts director focuses on preliminaries and makes strategic adjustment on 
the basis of gut feeling and experience. 
 
•General discussion on possible savings based on current project performance levels and 
personal knowledge of how much competitors are paying for subcontractors and materials.  
 
•Proactive judgement as to possible buying savings and discounts. Guaranteed payment terms 
offered to low risk subcontractors to attract higher discounts. 
 
•General tradeoff of risk allocation between preliminaries, subcontract packages and potential 
buying savings.  
 
•Assessment of markup for overheads and profit. Collective decision ratified by contracts 
director and estimating director. No formal analysis for selection of a suitable markup, 
however heuristic judgement and experience was used to assess a suitable addition in 
consideration of a variety of factors. 
 
•Adjustments to nett cost and completion of finance statement are continually updated by the 
project estimator for final preparation of the tender documents. 
 
14.30 HRS 
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•Conclusion of adjudication meeting. 
 
Comments. 
 
It is usual for the adjudication meeting to take place 1 or 2 days prior to final date for submission 
of tenders. It was decided to go ahead with the adjudication, despite the weeks extension. In 
retrospect it was concluded that insufficient information was available to do this. The 
adjudication meeting, in general, was relatively informal. Co-ordinated by the chief estimator the 
various participants were called upon as necessary, and when available. Summary documents 
were poorly prepared in the early stages, mainly due to the lack of submitted quotes as a result of 
the extension. Much of the information presented, even at the later stages, was presented 
informally and 'on the fly'.  
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C1-TA2 
 
JOB DESCRIPTION: Six storey extension  
CLIENT:   Building Society 
APPROX. VALUE:  £11 Million. 
TENDER SUBMISSION: 20 September 1991. 
 
19 September 1991 
10.30 HRS 
PRESENT:  CHIEF ESTIMATOR 
  PROJECT PLANNING ENGINEER 
 
•Planning engineer gave a general overview of the project peculiarities, groundworks, site 
access and restrictions, landscaping and specific peculiarities, such as the complexity of the 
brickwork and an excessive overmeasure of concrete in the foundations. 
•Analysis of programme requirements, sectional completion on tender drawings, but not in 
contract documents. 
 
11.20 HRS 
PRESENT: CHIEF ESTIMATOR 
  PROJECT PLANNING ENGINEER 
  PROJECT ESTIMATOR 
 
•General discussion of completed subcontractor comparisons and outlined general areas of risk 
or pricing difficulties. 
 
•Detailed analysis of quotes for the various subcontract packages, assessing particular risks 
elements and pricing peculiarities. Particular emphasis on the major subcontract packages. 
The brickwork labour and materials quote was given particular attention due to the variation 
in quotes received. Estimator aware, from experience, that lowest subcontractor had carried 
out the similar brickwork 'specials' on the existing building. 
 
 
13.00 HRS 
 
•Break for lunch 
 
14.00 HRS 
PRESENT: CHIEF ESTIMATOR 
  PROJECT ESTIMATOR 
 
•Continued analysis of subcontractor comparisons. Much of time spent in negotiation with 
subcontractors and suppliers to obtain the cheapest possible combination of labour, plant 
and materials. 
 
•Analysis of preliminaries breakdown, no amendments made at this stage. 
 
•Selection of suitable subcontractor from comparisons, completion of subcontractor summary 
and nett cost estimate for finance statement. 
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16.00 HRS 
PRESENT: CONTRACTS DIRECTOR 
  ESTIMATING DIRECTOR 
  CHIEF ESTIMATOR 
  PROJECT ESTIMATOR 
  PROJECT CONTRACTS MANAGER 
 
•Brief assessment of competitors, based on information primarily from subcontractors. 
 
•Brief analysis of contractual liabilities and onerous additions to the standard contract form for 
inclusion in the qualifying letter. 
 
•Looked in detail at two major subcontract packages, groundworks and brickwork. Examined 
possible alternative methods for basement retention. Estimator outlines risk elements and 
how reductions and savings on the quotation were made. Looked at various labour/plant and 
labour/plant/materials options. 
 
•Brickwork package subcontractor appreciably lower than other quotes, risk allowance made 
by not pricing any possible discount. Considered possible alternatives for the price 
submitted. 
 
•Analysis of preliminaries breakdown. Lengthy examination of the preliminaries breakdown, 
with particular emphasis on the supervisory requirements and site buildings. Historical and 
current projects were used to assess preliminary costs. Despite the detailed analysis, the 
final reduction to the preliminaries only amounted to some £2000. 
 
•Strategic adjustments made to the nett cost based on experience and knowledge of savings 
achieved on historical and current projects. 
 
•Discussion of a suitable markup for overheads and profit based on risks and current market 
decisions. Final decision on the level of markup decided by contracts director and estimating 
director based on the need to sustain overhead costs for the following year in the face of a 
shortage of 1992-93 jobs. 
 
•Adjustment to nett cost estimate made, completion of finance statement, including an for non 
fixed price fluctuations and preparation of tender documents. 
 
 
22.00 HRS 
 
Conclusion of tender adjudication meeting. 
 
 
Comments 
 
In general this adjudication meeting had a greater degree of structure than C1-TA1, however 
much of the information was still presented 'on the fly'.  
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Contractor 2 
 
C2-TA1 
 
JOB DESCRIPTION:Supermarket Distribution Depot.  Design and build project using external 
architect. 
APPROX. VALUE:  £12 Million. 
TENDER SUBMISSION: 23 August 1991. 
 
 
22 August 1991 
14.00 HRS 
PRESENT:  MANAGING DIRECTOR 
  ESTIMATING DIRECTOR 
  DESIGN SERVICES MANAGER 
  PROJECT ESTIMATOR 
 
•Initial overview of nature and peculiarities of the project, presentation of site photographs and 
schematic plans. Access and logistics of site. 
 
•Brief discussion of confidence in nett cost estimate and possible areas of risk. Information 
presented in estimator's summary documents which included the following: 
 
- Estimator's overview including percentage returns subcontractor enquiries, profit statement 
and tender  breakdown summary, analysis of key tender factors,    preliminaries breakdown 
and adjustments to quotes. 
 
- Subcontractor comparison summaries 
 
- Contractors proposals/options 
 
- Programme for the works 
 
 - Cash flow analysis 
 
- Contactual and legal factors for qualification 
 
•Analysis of competitors and their current performance, and identification of competition 
risks. 
 
•Assessed clients non price criteria, eg., landscaping the quarry face, rock fall risks etc. 
 
•Evaluation of subcontractors, looked at percentage return on quotes for each package. 
Discussion of pre-emptive buying savings achievable. Location of concrete plant in relation 
to site. 
 
• Brief analysis of preliminaries summary. 
 
•Strategic adjustment to nett cost estimate, omitted design services profit. 
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•Discussion of general risks, security, weather etc.. Analysis of contract conditions. 
 
•Allocation of markup for overheads and profit made solely by managing director based on 
information assimilated in the adjudication meeting and in consideration of subjective 
analysis of market conditions and the requirements of the firm. 
 
•Completion of the adjustments to the nett cost estimate and finance statement. 
 
 
15.15 Hrs 
 
•Conclusion of tender adjudication meeting. 
 
 
Comments 
 
The adjudication meeting was held in the managing directors office, and loosely followed a 
prespecified agenda. The information was generally well summarised and the managing director 
had a comparatively high degree of confidence in the summary documents. Very few 
adjustments to the nett cost estimate were made in the adjudication meeting. 
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C2-TA2 
 
JOB DESCRIPTION:General Hospital, renewal of    windows and roof 
coverings. 
APPROX. VALUE:  £3 Million. 
TENDER SUBMISSION: 23 October 1991, extended to 28 October 1991. 
 
 
21 October 1991 
09.30 HRS 
PRESENT:  MANAGING DIRECTOR 
  ESTIMATING DIRECTOR 
  PROJECT ESTIMATOR 
 
•Estimator presents general synopsis of project, site photographs and schematics. Phasing of 
work and working restrictions. 
 
•Managing director requested information on Q.S., but none available, unknown. 
 
•Estimator outlines major risks as presented in the tender summary documents (see C2-TA1). 
Principal risk element discussed, restrictive scaffolding requirements and temporary roof 
design in consideration of location and time of project ie., winter. Analyzed in conjunction 
with programme. 
 
•Risks involved with restrictive working specifications analyzed, also associated risks of 
replacing windows in an 18 year old building. 
 
•All nominated subcontractors so very little scope for discussion on subcontractors. 
 
•Brief analysis of competition, mainly small contractors and special works division of a large 
contractor. 
 
•Examination of preliminaries breakdown, analyzed scope for reduction of relatively high 
preliminaries estimate. Attempt to reduce preliminaries management costs. Looked at plant 
requirements and contractors site office requirements, suggested use of faxes etc. from 
existing sites. 
 
•Possible savings noted on hoisting equipment, plant hire companies currently seeking work. 
 
•Markup for overheads and profit set at a relatively high level, little incentive to win job, high 
risk, low potential for profit, little chance of winning as more suited to smaller contractor. 
 
•Complete adjustment to nett cost estimate and information summary and profit statement. 
 
10.30 HRS 
 
•Conclude tender adjudication meeting. 
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Comments 
 
Although the tender submission date was postponed it was decided to continue with the 
adjudication as all the relevant information had been prepared. There was little incentive to win 
this project other than the possibility of inclusion on the tender list of an eye hospital 
development on the same site. The adjudication was observed to be just 'going through the 
motions', effectively this was a strategic cover bid. 
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 Appendix II 
Bid Adjudication Data Flow Diagrams 
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 Appendix III 
Bid Adjudication Information Entities and Attributes with 
Principal Sources 
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Entity/Process Matrices 
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